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ABSTRACT 
 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
BANK CREDIT MATURITY AND 
ITS DETERMINANTS 
 
BY 
 
NIKOLA TASIC 
 
December, 2007 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Neven T. Valev 
Major Department: Economics 
 
This dissertation is an investigation into one of the important functions of the 
banking system: to transform short-term liquid deposits into long-term illiquid financial 
assets that can fund long gestation activities and, thus, raise the rate of economic growth. 
To investigate this function empirically, the dissertation uses two new data sets on the 
maturity of bank credit to the private sector. First data set contains yearly observations 
covering 74 countries during the period from about 1990 to 2005, while the second data 
set contains quarterly observations covering 14 transition countries from about 1995 to 
2006.  
Using the data on a broad set of countries, the dissertation shows that economic 
growth is enhanced in countries where the financial system extends more long-term 
credit. This finding is the first empirical confirmation of the theoretical predictions 
xiii 
regarding the liquidity transformation function of banks. Furthermore, using the same 
data set, the dissertation shows that credit maturity depends on a number of institutional 
and economic factors. The determinants of credit maturity have an impact on economic 
growth via their influence on the availability of long-term external financing. Credit 
maturity is longer in countries with strong legal institutions, with low inflation, with 
deeper financial markets, and with schemes for sharing credit information between 
financial institutions. From a policy perspective, the institutions for sharing credit 
information probably present the most interest because their establishment is a policy 
choice. 
Findings from the broad set of countries are confirmed in the second data set 
using several definitions of maturity. Additional results from the second data set suggest 
that credit maturity is longer in countries at the higher level of economic development, 
with less liquid stock markets, and with more privately owned domestic banks. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that credit information sharing mechanisms lengthen the 
maturity of credit if credit information sharing institutions are privately owned or have 
greater quality of information. 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The literature on financial development and economic growth has established that 
finance has a positive, statistically significant, and economically large causal effect on 
economic growth (Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000; Levine 2005; Wachtel 2001). The 
theoretical literature describes five functions of the financial system that can contribute  
to this effect. The extent to which the financial system performs these functions well has 
clear implications on the rate of economic growth. However, Levine (2005) points to the 
main weakness of the empirical literature as having “insufficiently precise link between 
theory and measurement.” 
In the following chapter we elaborate on this imprecise link and look in more 
detail into how one important function of the banking system, liquidity transformation, 
relates to the rate of economic growth from a theoretical perspective. We briefly review 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991), a paper that derives an insightful model of the economic 
growth and provides clear theoretical predictions that more liquid banking system 
increases the rate of economic growth. Such banking system transforms short-term liquid 
deposits into long-term illiquid financial assets that can fund long gestation activities and, 
thus, raise the rate of economic growth. In chapter 3 we provide empirical evidence for 
this function using a unique data set that covers 74 countries during the period from about 
1990 to 2005. We find that the banking system has a positive effect on economic growth, 
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as reported in the previous literature. In addition, we show that the effect is stronger when 
the banking system performs its liquidity transformation function well. This finding is the 
first empirical confirmation of the theoretical predictions regarding the liquidity 
transformation function of banks. This result is obtained using methodology found 
elsewhere in the literature, but slightly modified because of data limitations. In particular, 
the literature usually investigates the effect of finance on growth by averaging data over 5 
years to reduce the impact of business cycles and to concentrate on long-term growth. 
However, relatively short time series in most countries required using overlapping 
averages and the adjustment of the moving average component in the residuals as 
introduced by Newey and West (1987). 
Furthermore, in chapter 3 we show that the extent to which the banking system 
performs its liquidity provision function depends on a number of financial, economic, and 
institutional measures. The major determinants of the liquidity provision function of  the 
banking sector are rule of law, inflation, the existence of institutions for credit 
information sharing, and the size of the financial system. These effects are robust across 
various estimation techniques, specifications of the models, alternative institutional 
indexes, and different definitions of the credit information sharing. 
The data used in chapter 3, despite the coverage of a broad set of countries, have a 
limitation that prevents a full investigation of the extent to which the banking system 
performs its liquidity transformation function. The main limitation is the definition of 
long-term credit as credit with contractual maturity longer than one year. Using a more 
detailed data set that covers 14 countries, we partially overcome this limitation in chapter 
4. We do that by isolating the portion of credit with contractual maturity of one year or 
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less, the portion of credit with contractual maturity longer than one year, and the portion 
of credit with contractual maturity longer than five years. Thus, we can investigate short-
term, long-term, and very long-term credit.  
We find that most results on the determinants of the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than one year obtained in the two chapters are similar. For example, the 
rule of law remains a significant determinant of credit maturity and the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients is similar. Similarly, financial deepening is accompanied by 
lengthening of the maturity of credit in both samples. Inflation is a much more significant 
determinant in a broader set of countries, while per capita GDP growth and stock market 
activity are more significant in a smaller set of countries. In addition to the determinants 
investigated in a broad set of countries, in a smaller set we also investigate whether state 
and foreign ownership of banks influences credit maturity and find that credit maturity is 
longer in countries with more privately owned domestic banks. In a smaller set of 
countries we also look in more detail at credit information sharing institutions and find 
that the quality of information and the ownership structure of such institutions (public vs. 
private) have an important impact on maturity. 
Overall, this dissertation provides a detailed investigation into one of the 
important functions of the banking system: to transform short-term liquid deposits into 
long-term illiquid financial assets that can fund long gestation activities and, thus, raise 
the rate of economic growth. The dissertation confirms the theoretical predictions and 
shows that the availability of long-term credit is particularly important, as economic 
growth is faster in countries where the banking system extends more long-term credits. 
This is an important missing link between the theoretical and empirical literature on 
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financial development and economic growth. Furthermore, the dissertation shows that 
credit maturity depends on a number of institutional and economic factors. These factors 
also influence economic growth through their impact on credit maturity. 
 
 
 5 
CHAPTER TWO 
CREDIT MATURITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
A CONCISE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A large theoretical and empirical literature on financial development and 
economic growth has established that finance has a positive, statistically significant, and 
economically large causal effect on economic growth and its sources (Levine 2005). 
Theoretically, this effect arises through several channels which are summarized by 
Levine (2005) in five categories. The financial system increases the rate of economic 
growth as it: (1) produces information ex ante about possible investments and allocates 
capital, (2) monitors investments and exerts corporate governance after providing 
finance, (3) facilitates the trading, diversification, and management of risk, (4) mobilizes 
and pools savings, and (5) eases the exchange of goods and services. In essence, financial 
development can be defined as the extent to which the financial system performs these 
functions well. 
King and Levine (1993) note that in the view of economist like Goldsmith (1969), 
McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) “differences in the quantity and quality of services 
provided by financial institutions could partly explain why countries grow at different 
rates.” However, the empirical literature that investigates the growth effects of bank 
lending has focused only on the quantity of services rather than on quality of the services 
provided by the banking sector. The literature has relied on the assumption made by 
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Goldsmith (1969) that the size of the financial system is a good measure of the quantity 
and quality of functions the financial system provides. Levine (2005) recognizes that 
even 
The organization of the empirical evidence advertises an important 
weakness in the finance and growth literature: there is frequently an insufficiently 
precise link between theory and measurement. Theory focuses on particular 
functions provided by the financial sector, [while the empirical literature] pertains 
to the proxies for financial development. (Levine 2005) 
Furthermore, Beck and Levine (2004) note that ideally, researchers would 
construct a cross-country measure of how well banks perform their activities. The authors 
also note that “economists, however, have not been able to accurately measure these 
financial services … [and] consequently, researchers traditionally use measures of the 
overall size of the banking sector.” Levine (1999) notes that 
Ideally one would like to construct measures of the particular functions 
provided by the financial system. That is, one would like to have a comparative 
measure of the ability of the financial system to reach firms and identify 
profitable ventures, exert corporate control, manage risk, mobilize savings, and 
ease transactions. Accurately measuring the provision of these services in any 
single country would be extraordinarily difficult; doing it for a broad cross-
section of countries would be virtually impossible. (Levine 1999) 
This dissertation contributes in that direction by exploring one of the channels 
through which financial development enhances economic growth–liquidity provision and 
liquidity risk amelioration. In particular, the dissertation provides empirical evidence for 
the liquidity transformation function performed by banks, which is a part of the third 
function in Levine’s categorization described above. The dissertation shows that the 
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effect of banking sector activity on economic growth depends on the liquidity 
transformation function performed by banks. In addition, the dissertation explains what 
factors determine the extent to which the banking system performs liquidity 
transformation, and looks into how these factors in turn influence the rate of economic 
growth. Before turning to the empirical evidence and to the literature on the determinants 
of liquidity transformation, in the remainder of this chapter we review the theoretical 
literature relating the liquidity transformation function of banks to the rate of economic 
growth. This review will help in formulating the empirical hypothesis about this 
relationship. 
Levine (1997) defines liquidity as “the ease and speed with which agents can 
convert assets into purchasing power at agreed prices” and liquidity risk as the risk that 
“arises due to the uncertainties associated with converting assets into a medium of 
exchange.” Liquidity may be inhibited by various informational asymmetries as well as 
transaction costs and financial intermediaries and markets arise to ameliorate these 
problems. Levine explains that a system which properly provides liquidity will leave little 
uncertainty about the timing and settlement of contracts, and contracts will be 
inexpensive to trade. 
Furthermore, Levine (1997; 2005) explains that economic growth is closely 
linked to the liquidity provision function of the financial system. The link arises “because 
some high-return projects require a long commitment of capital, but savers do not like to 
relinquish control of their savings for long periods.” Therefore, the financial system plays 
a key role as it makes individual savers’ funds more liquid, while it invests a portion of 
the funds into illiquid long-term investments. 
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Levine (1997) draws on the historical evidence summed by Hicks (1969) to 
support this claim. According to Hicks, the improvements of capital markets that 
mitigated liquidity risks were the primary causes of the industrial revolution in England. 
Individual investors could hold liquid assets but at the same time the financial system 
transformed these “liquid financial instruments into long-term capital investments in 
illiquid production process.” As England’s industrial revolution required large 
commitments to capital for long periods of time, Levine (1997) goes as far as suggesting 
that “the industrial revolution may not have occurred without this liquidity 
transformation.” 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) formalize these ideas in an insightful model of 
economic growth. In their model financial institutions emerge to meet the liquidity needs 
of individual economic agents while allocating a higher proportion of the economy’s 
savings toward long-term investments compared to the case of financial autarky. The 
model adopts the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework of an economy populated by 
agents who are uncertain about their future liquidity needs at the time they make capital 
allocation decisions. This framework is incorporated into a growth model featuring 
capital investment externalities where production depends on firms’ individual capital 
levels as well as the societal capital level, as in Romer (1986). Economic growth is 
enhanced by the presence of financial institutions since they allocate a greater proportion 
of the economy’s savings to long-term, high productivity projects. 
In particular, there are two savings assets: one is a liquid asset that matures earlier 
but returns less of the consumption good than an illiquid asset. The higher return on the 
illiquid asset captures the idea of the slow production cycle of high productivity 
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investments, as well as the long gestation periods in capital production, as discussed by 
Böhm-Bawerk (1891), Cameron (1967), and Kydland and Prescott (1982). However, if 
the illiquid asset is liquidated before it matures, the liquidation value is lower than the 
return on the liquid asset.  
Individuals’ preferences over consumption are modeled as in Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) so that agents may experience a liquidity need in any period with some 
probability. If agents have invested a portion of their savings in the long-term assets and 
are faced with such liquidity need, agents liquidate their holdings of the long-term asset. 
They consume the amount available after liquidation, plus the proceeds from their short-
term investments. Consumption is lower compared to the case when the entire savings are 
allocated to the low-return but liquid asset (i.e.,, short-term investments). 
In this environment, agents invest a large proportion of their savings in the liquid 
asset reducing the funds available for the high productivity illiquid capital. Financial 
institutions emerge as a group of individual investors who pool their savings. The 
financial institution can meet the liquidity needs of its individual members by keeping 
reserves invested in the liquid asset. However, the financial institutions can keep a 
smaller fraction of the total savings in liquid assets compared to the case of financial 
autarky when individual agents allocate their savings between liquid and illiquid assets. 
By the law of large numbers, the need for liquidity is predictable on the aggregate level 
so the financial institution can keep reserves only in the amount necessary to meet that 
aggregate liquidity need. Therefore, with financial institutions, a greater portion of the 
savings is allocated to the long-term illiquid assets raising economic growth.  
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This is only a simplified and concise explanation of the results in Bencivenga and 
Smith (1991), as the paper pursues a number of additional avenues and provides 
additional interesting results. When savings are allowed to vary with or without banks, 
we see that the theoretical results are ambiguous. As the income and substitution effects 
are working in the opposite direction, increased liquidity risk amelioration may decrease 
savings. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) show that increasing liquidity can cause saving rates 
to fall enough to decrease equilibrium growth. Even when savings fall with the presence 
of financial intermediaries, the overall effect on growth can be positive if the 
intermediaries devote a higher portion of (smaller) savings to long-term credit, i.e., if 
long-term credit is greater under intermediaries than under autarky, despite overall credit 
being higher under autarky. In addition, empirical results that look at the impact of 
financial intermediation on savings have shown that financial intermediation has little or 
no impact on savings rates. Therefore, the assumption of financial intermediaries having 
no impact on savings is in line with the empirical work that shows no economically 
strong and statistically significant impact. 
Building on Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Greenwood and Smith (1997) show 
that the financial intermediation provided by banks is necessarily growth enhancing, 
while in the original model it was growth enhancing under some weak assumptions. 
Furthermore, Greenwood and Smith (1997) draw on Hicks (1969) and North (1981) to 
note that “new technologies could be employed only by ‘tying up’ large-scale 
investments in illiquid capital for long period.” By providing liquidity in an effective way 
the financial sector can promote investment in innovation, capital accumulation, and 
growth. 
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Noting that production processes can take a long time, be uncertain, and subject to 
shocks, Holmstrom and Triole (1998) argue that access to credit during production 
reduces the risk of premature liquidation and increases the incentives for investing in 
longer gestation, higher-return projects. Their model, however, does not provide a formal 
link between liquidity provision and economic growth as in Bencivenga and Smith  
(1991). In contrast, Aghion et al. (2005) show that innovation and long-run growth will 
be enhanced in an economy that experiences macroeconomic shocks but firms have 
access to credit during the entire production process. Their predictions are confirmed 
empirically by showing that financial development reduces the adverse growth effects of 
macroeconomic volatility. However, they do not investigate data on the maturity of 
credits.  
Despite the convincing arguments discussed above, the notion that long-term 
credit is good for growth is not universally accepted. Sissoko (2006) combines the 
monetary and the financial role of intermediaries into a growth model with the division of 
labor. The model allows agents to buy and sell a cash-in-advance constraint which gives 
rise to growth enhancing short-term credit. The model predicts that short-term credit 
increases growth, but the author does not tests this prediction for “lack of data on credit 
maturity.” 
Other theoretical work where short-term lending is growth-enhancing is the 
signaling framework of Flannery (1986): firms that are not concerned with reevaluation 
by the credit markets (good firms) will borrow short-term, while firms that fear 
reevaluation (bad firms) will want to borrow long-term. Therefore, short-term credit 
could have a positive effect on growth as more short-term credit implies more efficient 
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investments. However, this holds if there is no direct communication between borrower 
and lender, and signaling is the only form of communication.  
Still in the signaling framework, Titman (1992) introduces a more realistic setting 
(uncertain interest rate and financial distress cost) which leads good firms to a pooling 
long-term equilibrium, despite their wish to borrow short-term. Furthermore, Diamond 
(1991) shows that the good firms borrow short-term and long-term as this allows them to 
extract the benefits of good news while lowering liquidity risk.  
There are other theories that argue that long-term credit can increase economic 
growth by decreasing the likelihood of financial crises. Ennis and Keister (2003) present 
a model where long-term credit is beneficial for both growth and “crisis prevention.” The 
authors construct an endogenous growth model where bank runs affect capital stock and 
output permanently. Their model is similar to Bencivenga and Smith as the consumers 
have similar utility and banks can choose between similar investment opportunities. If 
banks keep their portfolio more illiquid, this raises the expected payoff to investors and 
induces them to wait until the long-term projects are completed. This lowers the 
probability of a run. As a result, the authors note that in their model there is “no tradeoff 
between growth and stability… [as] less liquid portfolios bring higher growth with fewer 
bank runs.” 
In summing the empirical evidence linking liquidity provision and economic 
growth, Levine (2005) notes that “isolating this liquidity function from the other financial 
functions performed by banks, however, has proven prohibitively difficult.” Because of 
this difficulty, research has focused on the effects of liquidity of one security on its price. 
Levine notes that, “security-level studies of the relationship between the liquidity of 
13 
 
individual securities and their prices, however, do not link liquidity with national long 
run growth rates.”  
Therefore, the empirical evidence is more limited and it focuses only on the 
liquidity provision by the stock market, while the literature linking the liquidity 
transformation function of banks and credit maturity to economic growth remains 
theoretical. This is not surprising as data on credit maturity are not readily available. 
Following the arguments in Bencivenga and Smith (1991), we collect cross country data 
on maturity of bank credit to the private sector. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) argue that 
long-term credit enhances growth. Drawing on this theoretical prediction, the remainder 
of this dissertation tests whether this theoretical prediction holds. In addition, we draw on 
the previous literature and investigate what factors influence the portion of credit given 
out as long-term. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MATURITY STRUCTURE OF BANK CREDIT: 
DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS 
ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
The literature on financial development and economic growth has established that 
finance has a positive, statistically significant, and economically large causal effect on 
economic growth (2005). There is, however, much less empirical evidence on the 
channels through which this positive effect is obtained. Levine (2005) points out that 
even the organization of the empirical evidence advertises an important weakness in the 
finance and growth literature: there is frequently an insufficiently precise link between 
theory and measurement: ”theory focuses on particular functions provided by the 
financial sector, [while the empirical literature] pertains to the proxies for financial 
development.” 
As discussed in the previous chapter, transforming liquid savings into illiquid 
assets that can fund long-term investment projects is one of the important functions of the 
financial system. Levine (1997) explains that economic growth is closely linked to the 
maturity transformation function of the financial system, as high-return projects require a 
long commitment of capital but savers do not like to relinquish control of their savings 
for long periods. The financial system plays a key role in preserving the liquidity of 
savings of individual savers while investing a portion of the funds into illiquid long-term 
projects. Historical evidence supports this claim. According to Hicks (1969), the capital 
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market improvements that mitigated liquidity risks were the primary cause of England’s 
industrial revolution as individual investors could hold liquid assets but at the same time 
the financial system transformed these liquid financial instruments into long-term capital 
investments. As England’s industrial revolution required large commitments of capital 
for long periods, Levine (1997) goes as far as noting that the industrial revolution may 
not have occurred without this liquidity transformation. 
Our objective is to provide empirical evidence for that function of the financial 
system. For that purpose we collect and analyze a unique data set on the maturity of 
domestic credit to the private sector in 74 countries during the period from about 1990 to 
2005. We ask two broad questions. First, what factors determine the differences in credit 
maturity across countries? For example, only 24 percent of domestic private credit in 
Mali has maturity longer than 1 year, whereas in Hungary 75 percent of credit has 
maturity longer than 1 year. What explains that difference? Second, we investigate 
whether the effect of private credit on economic growth depends on the maturity of 
credit. Theory suggests that credit will be more effective in terms of raising economic 
growth when the financial system performs better its maturity transformation function.   
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) develop an insightful model that formalizes the 
relationship between the maturity transformation role of banks and economic growth. 
There are two savings assets in the model: a liquid asset that matures early but returns 
less of the consumption good and an illiquid asset that has a higher (but later) payoff.1 If 
liquidated before it matures, the illiquid asset returns less than the liquid asset. Following 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), individuals are uncertain about their future liquidity needs 
                                                 
1 The higher return on the illiquid asset captures the idea of the slow production cycle of high productivity 
investments, as well as the long gestation periods in capital production, as discussed by Böhm-Bawerk 
(1891), Cameron (1967), and Kydland and Prescott (1982). 
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at the time they make capital allocation decisions and therefore they invest most of their 
savings into the liquid low-return asset. Financial institutions emerge as groups of 
individuals who pool their savings, keep a portion of the pooled savings in liquid assets to 
meet the liquidity needs of its members, and invest the remaining amounts in illiquid 
high-return project. Thus, the proportion of society’s savings that are invested in projects 
with high productivity increases and this enhances economic growth.2  
In Bencivenga and Smith, economic growth increases in the proportion of savings 
invested in long-term assets. We provide empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis. 
We show that the effect of private credit on economic growth is stronger when a larger 
fraction of private credit has long-term maturity. Our empirical evidence fits well with 
papers showing that the effect of finance on growth depends on the economic and 
institutional environment of a country. For example, Rousseau and Wachtel (2002), Choi, 
Smith, and Boyd (1996), Haslag and Koo (1999), Khan and Senhadji (2000), and Boyd, 
Levine and Smith (2001) show that the effect of credit on growth is diminished in high 
inflation countries. It is, however, not clear what function of the financial system is 
blocked in high inflation environments. Our results suggest that credit has a smaller effect 
on growth (at least partly) because the financial system shifts resources toward short-
term, less productive assets. 
                                                 
2 The notion that long-term lending enhances growth is not universally accepted. Sissoko (2006) combines 
the monetary and the financial role of intermediaries into a growth model where agents can buy and sell a 
cash-in-advance constraint. This gives rise to growth enhancing short-term credit, but the author does not 
test this prediction for lack of data on credit maturity. Also, in Flannery (1986) firms that are not concerned 
about reevaluation by the credit markets (good firms) will borrow short-term, while firms that fear 
reevaluation (bad firms) will want to borrow long-term. Therefore, short-term credit could have a positive 
effect on growth as more short-term credit implies more efficient investments. However, the more realistic 
setting of Titman (1992) with uncertain interest rate and financial distress costs motivates good firms to use 
long-term credit despite the lower contractual cost on short-term debt. Diamond (1991) also shows that 
good firms borrow short- and long-term to extract the benefits of good news while lowering liquidity risk. 
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Before we present that evidence, in order to become more familiar with credit 
maturity, we investigate its determinants by testing a number of empirical hypotheses 
drawn from the literature. The data show that credit maturity varies substantially across 
countries, even if the countries have a similar level of financial and economic 
development. We show that credit maturity is shorter in countries with lax rule of law, 
high inflation, less developed financial markets, and greater economic volatility.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. We describe the data in the 
following section. Section 2 draws empirical hypotheses from the literature and 
investigates the determinants of credit maturity. Section 3 present results for the effect of 
credit maturity on economic growth and section 4 concludes. 
Data on credit maturity 
We use data on lending by banks to the private sector in 74 countries spanning the 
period from about 1990 to 2005, depending on data availability for the individual 
countries. The data were collected from a variety of sources including publications by 
central banks and multilateral organizations. Table 1 provides variable definitions and 
details the sources of the data. The sample includes all countries for which we could 
identify a consistent data source. The summary statistics of our private credit variable, 
shown in Table 2, match closely those from the widely used World Bank data set on 
financial structure (see Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine 2000) for the entire sample and 
for each individual country. However, because our sample spans only more recent years, 
the summary statistics reveal a higher level of financial development compared to the 
World Bank data that begin in 1960. 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition Sources 
Credit / GDP Credit by deposit money banks and 
other financial institutions to the private 
sector divided by GDP. 
Long-Term 
Credit / GDP 
Long-Term Credit is credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial 
institutions to the private sector with the 
original contractual maturity longer 
than one year divided by GDP. 
Short-Term 
Credit / GDP 
Short-Term Credit is credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial 
institutions to the private sector with the 
original contractual maturity of one 
year or less divided by GDP. 
Percent Long-
Term Credit 
Credit with an original contractual 
maturity longer than one year divided 
by credit. 
Central Bank of West African States: 
Benin, Burkina, Guinea Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and 
Togo; Economic and Monetary 
Community of Central Africa: 
Cameroon, Central African R., Chad, 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon; 
Eurostat: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Czech R.*, Denmark, Finland, 
France*, Greece*, the Netherlands*, 
Norway, Poland*, Spain, and 
Sweden; and FDIC Statistics on 
Depository Institutions for the United 
States. For the remaining countries 
(and as second source for countries 
with * above) source was 
corresponding central bank (official 
publications and website). 
Real per capita 
GDP Growth 
The percent increase in real per capita 
GDP from the previous year. 
Per Capita GDP  The real per capita GDP in US dollars. 
Inflation The increase in the annual CPI. 
Trade / GDP Sum of imports and exports of goods 
and services as a share of GDP. 
Gov. / GDP General government consumption as 
share of GDP. 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
database of International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). In some cases data were 
retrieved from Eurostat database and 
Euromonitor International's World 
Marketing Data and Statistics (Plus) 
which uses IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook, United Nations, as well as 
national statistics in addition to IFS. 
Rule of Law Index that measures “the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement.” 
World Bank data set “Governance 
Matters VI” by Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2007). 
Banking 
Industry Conc. 
The assets of three largest banks as a 
share of assets of all commercial banks.
Stock Market 
Turnover Ratio 
Stock market volume traded during a 
year divided by the stock market 
capitalization at the end of the year. 
World Bank data set “A new database 
on financial development and 
structure” by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
and Levine (2000). 
Credit 
Information 
Sharing 
Dummy variable: 1 if public credit 
registry or private credit bureau 
operates in a country during a year, 0 
otherwise. 
Author constructed from Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), Miller 
(2003), and Brown, Japelli, and 
Pagano (2007). 
Manuf. Share of 
Output 
Value added by manufacturing divided 
by total value added. 
United Nations’ National Accounts 
Main Aggregates Database. 
Output Volatility Root mean squared errors from Growtht 
= α + εt, using data from the preceding 
10 years. 
Author constructed from data on Real 
per capita GDP Growth. 
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Credit is decomposed into two categories: short-term credit that has contractual 
maturity of one year or less and long-term credit that has contractual maturity longer than 
one year. Some countries, most notably many of the transition economies, provide more 
detailed data on credit maturity–up to one year, one to five years and longer than 5 years. 
Some countries report maturity longer than 7 or even 15 years. While it would be 
interesting to investigate credit with different maturity structures (e.g., medium-term, 
long-term, and “very long-term” credit), the only categorization that is consistent across 
all countries is the one that divides credit into short-term credit with maturity of one year 
or less and other credits. Therefore, we proceed with this definition of short-term and 
long-term debt but we also explore other maturity structures in the following chapter with 
a smaller sample. 
Table 3 shows large differences in terms of financial development measured as 
private credit as percent of GDP. For example, in Albania, Azerbaijan, Chad and several 
other countries, private credit is below 10 percent of GDP whereas in Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Taiwan and several other countries it is well over 100 percent of 
GDP. Table 4, which reports the credit averages for three groups of countries based on 
income, shows that private bank credit has the lowest level in low income countries 
(25.01 percent of GDP), compared to middle income countries (58.31 percent of GDP) 
and high income countries (93.81 percent of GDP). 
On average, 54.14 percent of bank credit to the private sector has long-term 
maturity. There are, however, large differences between countries. Long-term credit is 
less than 30 percent of total credit in a number of countries including Bangladesh, The 
Central African Republic, Niger and Lesotho and it is greater than 70 percent of total 
  
21
Ta
bl
e 
3.
 C
ou
nt
ry
 A
ve
ra
ge
s o
f C
re
di
t a
nd
 C
re
di
t M
at
ur
ity
 
C
ou
nt
ry
 
C
re
di
t /
 
G
D
P 
Lo
ng
-
Te
rm
 
C
re
di
t /
 
G
D
P 
Sh
or
t- 
Te
rm
 
C
re
di
t 
/ G
D
P
Pe
rc
en
t 
Lo
ng
- 
Te
rm
 
C
re
di
t 
C
ou
nt
ry
 
C
re
di
t /
 
G
D
P 
Lo
ng
-
Te
rm
 
C
re
di
t /
 
G
D
P 
Sh
or
t- 
Te
rm
 
C
re
di
t 
/ G
D
P 
Pe
rc
en
t 
Lo
ng
- 
Te
rm
 
C
re
di
t 
C
ou
nt
ry
 
C
re
di
t /
 
G
D
P 
Lo
ng
-
Te
rm
 
C
re
di
t /
 
G
D
P 
Sh
or
t- 
Te
rm
 
C
re
di
t 
/G
D
P
Pe
rc
en
t 
Lo
ng
- 
Te
rm
 
C
re
di
t
A
lb
an
ia
 
5.
72
 
2.
99
2.
73
45
.7
9
G
eo
rg
ia
  
8.
16
3.
73
4.
44
35
.0
8
N
or
w
ay
  
77
.4
5
66
.9
9
10
.4
5
86
.4
4
A
rm
en
ia
  
34
.4
7 
21
.8
6
12
.6
1
63
.4
1
G
er
m
an
y 
 
95
.3
6
79
.1
8
16
.1
8
82
.8
2
Po
la
nd
  
15
.3
2
9.
09
6.
23
59
.4
1
A
us
tri
a 
 
11
5.
33
 
86
.8
8
28
.4
5
75
.2
8
G
re
ec
e 
 
49
.1
5
24
.8
3
24
.3
3
49
.1
8
Po
rtu
ga
l  
12
6.
82
91
.9
8
34
.8
4
69
.3
2
A
ze
rb
ai
ja
n 
 
0.
08
 
0.
02
0.
06
25
.4
4
G
ui
ne
a 
B
is
sa
u
2.
22
0.
38
1.
84
14
.2
1
R
om
an
ia
  
16
.4
8
5.
99
10
.4
9
34
.9
B
ah
am
as
, T
he
 
69
.1
8 
62
.7
4
6.
44
90
.6
H
un
ga
ry
  
72
.2
3
54
.8
7
17
.3
6
75
.4
1
R
us
si
a 
 
14
.2
2
6.
51
7.
7
47
.5
9
B
an
gl
ad
es
h 
38
.9
8 
5.
47
33
.5
14
.0
1
Ic
el
an
d 
 
92
.6
6
31
.9
2
60
.7
5
35
.2
8
Sa
ud
i A
ra
bi
a 
29
.4
6
10
.0
9
19
.3
7
33
.1
2
B
el
gi
um
  
10
1.
5 
67
.6
2
33
.8
8
66
.8
6
Ir
el
an
d 
 
11
9.
13
93
.2
25
.9
3
77
.4
1
Se
ne
ga
l  
19
.6
9
7.
26
12
.4
3
37
B
en
in
  
13
.4
 
3.
94
9.
46
29
.3
6
Ita
ly
  
73
.8
8
39
.2
9
34
.5
9
52
.6
6
Se
rb
ia
, R
ep
.
56
.9
7
14
.8
6
42
.1
1
31
.4
4
B
ol
iv
ia
  
36
.8
4 
27
.1
2
9.
72
73
.7
7
Iv
or
y 
C
oa
st
  
14
.0
1
3.
52
10
.4
9
25
.1
Si
ng
ap
or
e 
66
.3
4
41
.5
9
24
.7
5
60
.9
B
os
ni
a&
H
er
ze
go
v.
39
.7
5 
28
.9
8
10
.7
7
72
.5
6
Jo
rd
an
  
79
.9
27
.2
3
52
.6
7
33
.7
4
Sl
ov
ak
 R
ep
.
25
.7
6
17
.3
6
8.
39
67
.2
6
B
ul
ga
ria
  
19
.1
3 
14
5.
12
68
.0
9
K
az
ak
hs
ta
n 
 
16
.3
9.
84
6.
46
49
.1
3
Sl
ov
en
ia
  
28
.0
2
17
.0
2
11
59
.6
8
B
ur
ki
na
 
13
.5
5 
4.
14
9.
41
30
.3
9
K
yr
gy
z 
R
ep
. 
2.
31
0.
34
1.
97
13
.9
Sp
ai
n 
 
91
.6
4
71
.3
3
20
.3
1
77
.3
1
C
am
er
oo
n 
 
10
.2
7 
2.
91
7.
36
28
.3
1
La
tv
ia
  
28
.4
4
21
.6
8
6.
77
65
.2
1
Sr
i L
an
ka
  
25
.0
7
10
.1
1
14
.9
6
40
.2
C
en
t. 
A
fr
ic
an
 R
ep
. 
6.
88
 
0.
59
6.
29
8.
76
Le
so
th
o 
 
8.
28
2.
29
5.
99
21
.7
6
Sw
ed
en
  
11
2.
06
10
9.
18
2.
88
97
.4
5
C
ha
d 
 
5.
82
 
0.
62
5.
2
11
.4
5
Li
th
ua
ni
a 
 
17
.9
5
11
.6
6
6.
29
58
.2
1
Ta
iw
an
 
14
3.
59
99
.6
6
43
.9
3
69
.3
7
C
hi
na
  
10
6.
76
 
38
.8
9
67
.8
7
36
.2
4
Lu
xe
m
bo
ur
g 
97
.3
6
58
.2
4
39
.1
2
59
.8
7
To
go
  
14
.9
7
6.
13
8.
83
41
.4
7
C
on
go
  
11
.1
1 
1.
13
9.
98
21
.4
M
ac
au
  
65
.1
7
39
.8
9
25
.2
8
61
.7
7
Tu
ni
si
a 
 
65
.3
4
30
.3
5
34
.9
9
46
.3
5
C
yp
ru
s  
19
9.
09
 
18
4.
72
14
.3
7
92
.7
7
M
ac
ed
on
ia
 
13
.0
3
6.
56
6.
47
46
.3
6
Tu
rk
ey
 
57
.2
3
52
.5
9
4.
64
91
.6
2
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
ub
lic
  
49
.2
7 
31
.4
17
.8
6
65
.0
2
M
al
ay
si
a 
 
12
6.
31
60
.0
4
66
.2
7
47
.8
3
U
kr
ai
ne
  
7.
07
3.
72
3.
35
27
.3
6
D
en
m
ar
k 
23
.5
4 
10
.0
3
13
.5
1
40
.9
8
M
al
i  
19
.2
3
4.
67
14
.5
5
24
.2
4
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
62
.2
4
27
.5
8
34
.6
6
44
.0
1
Eq
ua
to
ria
l G
ui
ne
a 
2.
78
 
0.
58
2.
2
21
.4
2
M
on
go
lia
  
23
.7
5.
39
18
.3
1
20
.6
5
U
ru
gu
ay
  
58
.8
32
.1
6
26
.6
4
52
.1
6
Es
to
ni
a 
 
41
.3
7 
36
5.
37
82
.5
2
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e 
14
.1
9
6.
12
8.
07
44
.0
5
Y
em
en
  
5.
08
0.
28
4.
81
5.
53
Fi
nl
an
d 
81
.6
6 
74
.3
4
7.
32
91
.0
5
N
et
he
rla
nd
s 
13
4.
8
10
0.
64
34
.1
6
74
.3
7
 
Fr
an
ce
  
86
.2
2 
72
.9
8
13
.2
4
84
.6
4
N
ic
ar
ag
ua
  
24
.0
4
12
.9
2
11
.1
2
53
.8
1
Sa
m
pl
e 
53
.0
4
34
.8
8
18
.1
6
54
.1
4
G
ab
on
  
12
.4
1 
5.
41
7.
01
43
.6
6
N
ig
er
  
5.
95
1.
42
4.
54
23
.2
6
 
N
ot
es
: P
re
se
nt
ed
 a
re
 c
ou
nt
ry
 a
ve
ra
ge
s f
or
 th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
ye
ar
s. 
Se
e 
Ta
bl
e 
1 
fo
r v
ar
ia
bl
e 
de
fin
iti
on
s.
22 
 
credit in Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Norway, and several other countries. Table 4 shows 
that there are systematic differences in credit maturity between countries at different 
levels of economic and financial development. In low income countries, the percent long-
term credit is 40.38 percent, whereas in middle income and high income countries it is, 
respectively, 63.17 percent and 72.39 percent. More developed economies have more 
private credit and, also, a greater portion of their credits have long-term maturity. 
However, notice in Table 2 that the correlation coefficient of the level of credit and credit 
maturity is not very large in magnitude (0.57), i.e., credit maturity can differ across 
countries with the same levels of financial development. For example, credit is about 95 
percent of GDP in Germany and Belgium. However, the percent long-term credit is about 
83 percent in Germany and about 66 percent in Belgium. Also, private credit is about 40 
percent of GDP in both Bangladesh and Estonia. However, in Estonia long-term credit is 
about 83 percent of total credit and in Bangladesh it is only about 14 percent of total 
credit. 
Table 4. Income and Bank Credit Maturity 
  
Real per 
capita GDP 
Growth Credit / GDP
Long-Term 
Credit / 
GDP 
Short-Term 
Credit / GDP 
Percent 
Long-Term 
Credit 
Low income countries 2.64 25.01 12.08 12.93 40.38
Middle income countries 3.04 58.31 39.91 18.40 63.17
High income countries 2.20 93.81 69.16 24.65 72.39
Notes: Presented are the average values for each variable for three income groups defined as low 
income if per capita GDP is below $1,715, middle income if it is between $1,715 and $10,800, 
and as high income if it is above $10,800. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
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The determinants of credit maturity 
Building on Modigliani and Miller (1958), Stiglitz (1974) shows that in a perfect 
world the maturity of credit, as any other financing decision, is irrelevant. Subsequent 
research has added transaction costs, informational asymmetries, liquidation costs, and 
taxes to that framework as a result of which maturity becomes an important factor in 
financing decisions. There is a large empirical literature on the determinants of credit 
maturity from individual (mostly industrialized) countries reviewed by Ravid (1996).  
In terms of cross country evidence, Qian and Strahan (2007) and Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1999) investigate the determinants of credit maturity in samples of, 
respectively, 43 and 30 countries with a particular focus on the effect of legal institutions. 
We stay close to their analysis in terms of the selection of the country-level explanatory 
variables but we expand the number of countries substantially and we also include 
additional explanatory variables such as economic volatility and banking system 
concentration.  Furthermore, we use the maturity of bank credit to the entire private 
sector whereas Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Qian and Strahan (2007) 
analyze the borrowing by publicly traded companies only. Using the total private bank 
credit allows us to link the results to the finance and growth literature which has used that 
variable extensively. 
Empirical hypotheses 
Legal Institutions 
The literature provides substantial evidence that weak legal institutions are a 
primary reason for the underdevelopment of financial markets as lenders cannot 
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effectively monitor and exert control over borrowers (La Porta et al. 1997; 1998). 
Inefficient protection of creditor rights leads to a reduction in the volume of external 
financing provided by financial institutions to the private sector. Furthermore, institutions 
affect the terms of credits and the maturity of credit in particular. Diamond (1991; 1993) 
and Rajan (1992) show that short-term lending facilitates the enforcement of credit 
contracts as it limits the period during which an opportunistic firm can exploit its 
creditors without being in default. Diamond (2004) argues that “maturity acts as a 
substitute contracting tool to control borrower risk,” and that bank loan maturity is 
“especially sensitive to the legal environment.”  Giannetti (2003) also argues that if the 
law does not guarantee creditor rights, lenders would prefer short-term debt to control 
entrepreneurs’ opportunistic behavior by using the threat of not renewing their loans. In 
line with these theories, we expect to find that weak institutions contribute to shorter 
maturity.  
High Inflation 
Similar to weak institutions, high inflation is detrimental to the development of 
the financial system as it limits the amount of external financing available to borrowers 
(Huybens and Smith 1998, 1999). Furthermore, similar to institutions, high inflation 
affects credit maturity. Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) point out that financial 
intermediaries are less willing to engage in long-run financial commitments in high 
inflation environments. Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) also argue that high inflation will 
“discourage any long term financial contracting and financial intermediaries will tend to 
maintain very liquid portfolios. In this inflationary environment intermediaries will be 
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less eager to provide long-term financing for capital formation and growth.” Therefore, 
we expect that high inflation reduces the fraction of credits with long-term maturity.  
Stock Market Development 
Stock market development has an ambiguous effect on credit maturity. According 
to one view, a well functioning stock market could be a substitute source of long-term 
financing and would therefore reduce the demand for long-term bank financing. Diamond 
(1997) argues that increased participation in markets causes the banking sector to shrink, 
primarily through reduced holdings of long-term assets. An alternative view holds that a 
developed stock market increases the ability of firms to obtain long-term financing as it 
helps reveal information about the borrowers and reduces information asymmetries 
(Grossman 1976; Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). Therefore, theoretically the effect of 
stock market development on long-term bank financing is ambiguous. 
Banking Sector Competition 
Banking sector competition can have a dual effect on the provision of external 
financing and the provision of long-term financing in particular. A high level of 
concentration in the banking sector may raise the cost of funds and thus reduce external 
financing (Pagano 1993). Alternatively, high concentration in the banking industry may 
foster close relationships between banks and borrowers which reduces information 
asymmetries and the cost of monitoring borrowers (Mayer 1988; Mayer and Hubbard 
1990; Petersen and Rajan 1995). Therefore, the theoretical effect of banking system 
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concentration on debt maturity is ambiguous.3 Testing the bank-firm relationship 
hypothesis Giannetti (2003) finds that, contrary to (her) expectations, maturity is shorter 
in countries where the banking system is more concentrated.  
Overall Level of Bank Credit 
Diamond (1984) highlights the function of banks as “delegated monitors” that 
emerge to reduce the cost of monitoring borrowers by exploiting economies of scale. In 
the absence of banks, individual savers would incur the cost of assessing and monitoring 
investment projects. With economies of scale, a larger banking system would have lower 
monitoring costs, which reduces lending risk and increases the supply of long-term debt. 
There is, however, an additional effect related to the volume of credit extended in an 
economy. Diamond and Rajan (2000) argue that a larger pool of smaller, riskier, and less 
collateralized borrowers would obtain access to external financing with the expansion of 
the financial system. As most of the credits to these riskier borrowers are short-term, the 
proportion of short-term debt in total debt would increase as overall lending increases. 
Thus, the theoretical effect of credit levels of credit maturity is ambiguous.  
Real Per Capita GDP 
Ravid (1996) points to the “industry paradigm” of matching maturities introduced 
by Morris (1976) where a firm with long-term assets should use long-term debt. If the 
maturity of debt is longer than the asset life, the borrower might have a problem finding 
                                                 
3 Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) investigate whether the market structure of the banking sector has empirical 
relevance for economic growth, finding that banking system concentration has a non-trivial impact on 
growth, but that competition in banking does not necessarily dominate monopoly and vice versa. 
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new assets to invest in but will have to continue servicing the debt. If debt maturity is 
shorter than the asset life, then the borrower is exposed to the risk of being short on cash 
when debt payments are due. Stohs and Mauer (1996) find evidence for this on the firm 
level. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), we use per capita GDP to 
proxy for the amount of fixed assets in a country, with richer countries having a larger 
stock of long-term assets. Thus, higher GDP per capita is expected to be associated with 
longer debt maturity.  
Credit Information Sharing 
Empirical researchers have shown that countries with institutions that gather and 
share information about borrowers have higher private credit to GDP ratios (Brown, 
Jappelli, and Pagano 2007; Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007; Jappelli and Pagano 
2002).4 Furthermore, because lack of information reduces the supply of long-term credit 
(Diamond 2004), information sharing is also expected to lengthen debt maturity. Zhang 
and Sorge (2007) provide a direct link between credit information sharing and credit 
maturity in a model where information sharing is used by banks as a screening device and 
leads to an equilibrium where short-term contracts are not preferred. Empirically, Zhang 
and Sorge (2007) confirm their main hypothesis using data from publicly traded 
companies to show that information sharing leads to longer credit maturity. We expect to 
find the same effect.  
                                                 
4 Information sharing overcomes adverse selection (Pagano and Jappelli 1993) and moral hazard problems 
(Padilla and Pagano 2000) in the credit markets. While, theoretically, the impact of information sharing on 
aggregate lending is ambiguous, the increase in lending to safe borrowers is certain. 
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Real Per Capita GDP Growth 
Smith and Watts (1992) note that GDP growth rates can serve as a proxy for 
investment opportunities: the demand for external financing would increase in boom 
times and will recede in recession periods. It is not clear, however, whether expansions 
would stimulate the demand for long-term and short-term credit in different ways. 
Nonetheless, we follow the literature (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Qian and 
Strahan 2007) and include the growth rate of per capita GDP in our estimations.  
Output Volatility 
Booth, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) look at the variability of the 
return-on-assets to proxy for business risk expecting that an increase in variability would 
shorten the maturity of credit as it proxies for the short-term operational component of 
business risk. Giannetti (2003) notes that controlling for such risk has been neglected in 
the previous cross-country research, at least partly because of lack of suitable empirical 
proxies. The author uses a similar variable, but at the sectoral level, and shows that the 
percent short-term debt increases with higher volatility of the return-on-assets of the 
corresponding sector in that country. It is more difficult to account for such risks at the 
country level. Nevertheless, if per capita GDP growth is a suitable proxy for investment 
opportunities as noted in the previous literature, then its variability can be used as a 
measure of business risk.5 
                                                 
5 In the context of international lending, Valev (2007) relies on the same proxy and shows that higher 
volatility of per capita GDP growth in a country leads U.S. banks to shorten the maturity of credit to that 
country. 
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Manufacturing Share of Output 
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) show that the maturity 
of credit differs substantially across economic sectors with manufacturing firms having a 
larger fraction of long-term credit as percent of their overall credit. We include the 
percent of manufacturing in total output as a proxy for the importance of the 
manufacturing sector on the country level. We expect that credit in countries with a larger 
manufacturing sector will have longer maturity.   
The correlations in Panel B of Table 2 show that inflation and output volatility are 
negatively and significantly correlated with the percent long-term credit. Also, rule of 
law, credit information sharing, and GDP per capita are positively and significantly 
correlated with the percent long-term credit. The correlation between economic growth 
and the percent long-term credit is positive and significant as is the correlation between 
the credit level and the percent long-term credit. 
Methodology 
By construction private credit and the percent long-term credit are determined 
jointly and, therefore, we need to control for the endogeneity of private credit. Following 
the literature, we use countries’ legal origin as external instruments for the level of credit. 
However, for those to be valid instruments, we would have to assume that legal origin 
does not have an impact on credit maturity, except through its effect on credit. This may 
not be the case as Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Qian and Strahan (2007) 
find that legal origin influences credit maturity. In addition, we would be constrained to 
using a random effects model (since the legal origin does not change over time) even 
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though the Hausman test reveals that the explanatory variables used in the random-effects 
model are correlated with the country specific effects and, therefore, we have to use a 
fixed-effects estimation. To resolve these problems, we implement the Hausman-Taylor 
(1981) estimator that corrects for correlation between the explanatory variables and the 
country-level random-effects, and does not require the use of outside instruments.6 
When explaining the percent long-term credit one concern that arises is that the 
dependent variable is a ratio (between 0 and 100 percent) making OLS problematic as the 
predicted values might lay outside the unit interval (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). This 
may require the transformation of the dependent variable using a log-odds transformation 
(log(y/1−y)). However, the coefficient estimates using the log-odds ratio are difficult to 
interpret in a panel setting and therefore we follow the previous literature (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic 1999; Rodrik and Velasco 1999; Valev 2006; 2007) and do not 
perform the transformation. Furthermore, less than 1 percent of the predicted values from 
the models fall outside the unit interval. 
Results 
Table 5 presents the empirical results regarding determinants of credit maturity. 
We start with a benchmark equation where the percent long-term debt is explained by 
rule of law, inflation, financial and economic development, and economic growth. Then 
we add, one at a time, a dummy variable for credit information sharing, banking system  
                                                 
6 For robustness, Table C1in the appendix presents a set of empirical results where we use a random-effects 
estimator, a fixed-effects estimator, GLS estimators that control for a heteroskedastic error structure and 
allow for AR(1) autocorrelation, as well as a two-stage least squares random-effects estimator. The 
estimated effects are similar across the various estimations. 
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Table 5. Determinants of Credit Maturity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
5.308 5.041 4.490 6.925 4.197 8.331 6.857Rule of Law 
(0.035) (0.043) (0.145) (0.044) (0.105) (0.003) (0.047)
-3.939 -3.364 -2.455 -12.418 -2.848 -3.861 -11.418Inflation  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.021) (0.002) (0.000) (0.070)
0.266 0.220 0.138 -0.045 0.137 0.261 0.194Growth 
(0.081) (0.148) (0.424) (0.823) (0.369) (0.099) (0.334)
11.006 10.443 11.291 14.962 13.465 11.516 15.098Credit 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.311 0.362 0.698 0.270 0.148 0.109 0.334Income 
(0.248) (0.175) (0.029) (0.388) (0.580) (0.711) (0.300)
6.940 6.573Credit Information 
Sharing (0.001) (0.001)
1.504 5.092Banking Industry 
Concentration (0.632) (0.140)
-0.952 0.142Stock Market Turnover 
Ratio (0.168) (0.832)
-0.678 0.003Output Volatility 
(0.595) (0.999)
-1.010 -0.611Manufacturing Share of 
Output (0.000) (0.038)
5.141 7.888 12.948 -2.505 -1.218 0.506 -0.281U.K. Legal Origin 
(0.658) (0.495) (0.366) (0.844) (0.915) (0.969) (0.983)
9.606 10.718 15.879 1.866 3.427 4.217 3.905French Legal Origin 
(0.400) (0.345) (0.256) (0.877) (0.762) (0.740) (0.746)
11.818 12.313 15.010 6.453 8.347 14.710 10.642German Legal Origin 
(0.394) (0.375) (0.379) (0.660) (0.581) (0.360) (0.491)
23.087 26.770 32.466 26.432 16.725 24.301 32.692Socialist Legal Origin 
(0.055) (0.026) (0.029) (0.056) (0.161) (0.068) (0.017)
48.685 40.788 39.351 52.309 59.692 67.446 55.856Constant 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hausman test:       χ2 (d.f.) 6.41 (5) 5.43 (6) 8.83 (6) 4.87 (6) 3.46 (6) 2.09 (6) 0.88 (10)
p-value 0.268 0.490 0.183 0.561 0.749 0.911 0.909
Observations 504 504 419 322 483 418 284
Countries 71 71 67 48 68 65 45
Notes:  See Table 1 for variable definitions. Results are based on Hausman-Taylor estimation, 
where Credit is endogenous. P-values are reported in parentheses below coefficients. Credit is 
treated as endogenous. The Hausman test has a null hypothesis that the explanatory variables are 
not correlated with the country-specific random-effects. 
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concentration, stock market development measured by the stock market turnover ratio, 
output volatility, and the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP. In column (7) we 
report the estimations from a regression where we include all explanatory variables. 
It is immediately clear that the rule of law has a statistically significant and robust 
effect on the maturity of credit. Greater rule of law is associated with longer debt 
maturity. Looking at the estimations from the benchmark equation, a decrease in the rule 
of raw by one standard deviation leads to a decrease of the percent long-term credit by 
5.57 percentage points (1.05*5.308). This result compares well with previous findings. In 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), a decrease of the Law & Order index by 1.05 
index points decreases the percent long-term debt by 5.78 percentage points.7 To 
illustrate, if the Slovak Republic (where the rule of law index is 0.288) had the rule of 
law level of Austria (1.891), its long-term credit would increase by 8.51 percentage 
points.  
Inflation also affects credit maturity in significant ways with higher inflation 
leading to shorter credit maturity in all specifications. We explore the size of the effect of 
inflation in more detail later. Countries with deeper financial markets have a greater 
fraction of long-term credits. The estimates from the benchmark equation in column (1) 
suggest that if Slovakia (where private credit is 25.67 percent of GDP) had the level of 
private credit of Hungary (72.22 percent), it would also have 11.38 percentage points 
greater percent long-term credit. Thus, the process of financial deepening is accompanied 
by lengthening of the maturity of credit as suggested by Diamond (1984). 
                                                 
7 Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) use a different index to measure rule of law but their index has a 
nearly identical definition to ours (“the degree to which citizens of a country are able to utilize the existing 
legal system to mediate disputes and enforce contracts”). In addition, their index has a similar standard 
deviation (1.597) and a similar range (4.286).  
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To test whether information sharing affects credit maturity, we follow Qian and 
Strahan (2007) and include a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country had either a 
public credit registry or a private credit bureau in a particular year, and 0 otherwise. 
Credit information sharing is statistically significant when included in the base estimation 
model and in the full model. The more conservative yet statistically significant estimate 
in column (7) suggests that if Luxembourg had established a credit information sharing 
institution, the percent long-term credit would increase from 59.72 percent to 66.30 
percent, bringing it to the same percentage long-term credit as in Belgium. Using the 
same estimate, if China had not established a credit information sharing institution in 
2003, the average percent long-term credit would have remained at 29.48 percent, a level 
below Congo or Burkina. Instead, the percent long-term credit in China increased to 
36.24 percent.  
China is not the only country that established a credit information sharing 
institution during the years covered by our data–Norway implemented one in 1998, 
Bulgaria in 1999, and Romania in 2000, to name a few. Figure 1 shows that, perhaps not 
coincidentally, the percent long-term credit increased in all countries that implemented a 
credit information sharing institution (except Serbia, where the implementation coincided 
with financial liberalization, closure of major banks, and overall reduction in credit). This 
was particularly true in countries that started at a relatively low percent of long-term 
credit. For example, the percent long-term credit in Romania doubled after the 
introduction of a public credit registry. 
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Figure 1. Credit Information Sharing Institutions and Credit Maturity. Plotted are the 
averages of the percent long-term credit for the period before and after the establishment 
of credit information sharing institutions. The years included vary by country depending 
on data availability. For The Czech Republic each period includes 5 years; for Latvia, 
Poland, Romania, and Republic of Serbia 4 years; for Bulgaria and China 3 years; for 
FRY Macedonia 2 years; and for Norway 1 year. 
Economic development measured by per capita GDP, which was included to 
proxy for the importance of long-term capital and to test the hypothesis of maturity 
matching is not statistically significant. This result differs from Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) who find evidence for maturity matching on the firm level. The 
difference in results may be attributed to the imprecise measure of fixed assets that we 
employ compared to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic who use a direct measure of fixed 
assets as a share of total assets. Similar to us, Qian and Strahan (2007) use per capita 
GDP to control for economic development and report an insignificant impact on maturity. 
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GDP growth has mostly a positive coefficient, which implies that faster growing 
countries have more long-term credit. However, the coefficient is significant at the 
accepted confidence levels only when we control for the manufacturing share of output in 
column (6) and therefore we refrain from making stronger claims. Nevertheless, with the 
results on inflation, we interpret this finding in line with Booth, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2001): agents can borrow to invest in more productive, longer gestation 
projects against real, but not against inflationary growth prospects.  
The rest of the results suggest that banking industry concentration, stock market 
development, and output volatility do not affect bank credit maturity. Contrary to 
expectations, a greater share of manufacturing is associated with less long-term credit. 
Unfortunately data limitations prevent us from investigating whether this effect is driven 
by particular non-manufacturing sectors, e.g., utilities, transportation, and/or 
construction. 
Inflation and Credit Maturity 
To examine further the relationship between inflation and credit maturity, we 
reestimated the regression reported in column (7) using 40 subsamples ordered by the 
rate of inflation as in Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) and Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001). 
Both papers investigate the effect of inflation on financial sector activity and not on the 
maturity of credit specifically. However, the authors explain that the effect of financial 
development on economic growth diminishes with inflation because high inflation limits 
long-term financial contracting. Here we provide direct evidence for that idea.  
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Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) find that inflation reduces the availability of bank 
credit at low inflation rates but after some threshold (which they estimate to be around 16 
percent) the negative effect of additional inflation on credit activity disappears. Similarly, 
Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) conclude that, while there is a statistically significant 
and economically important negative relationship between inflation and banking sector 
development, the marginal impact of inflation on bank lending activity diminishes 
rapidly. The threshold inflation rate above which inflation has no effect on credit market 
activity in Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) is very close to that in Rousseau and Wachtel 
(2002): 15 percent. Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) conclude that until this threshold is 
reached “the damage to the financial system has already been done, [and] further 
increases in inflation will have no additional consequences for financial sector 
performance or economic growth.” This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence from 
Brazil provided by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) who explain that an 
inflationary environment gives rise to the indexation of financial contracts (and the 
dollarization of financial assets) reducing the negative impact of additional high inflation 
on credit markets.  
To examine these ideas using our data set, we sorted all observations according to 
the rate of inflation and estimated repeatedly the full model from column (7) in Table 4 
starting with observations 1 through 244, then on 2 through 245, continuing until the last 
subsample that includes observations 40 through 284. The estimated coefficients of 
inflation, along with the 95 percent confidence intervals, are plotted in Figure 2. Looking 
at Figure 2, we can identify three regions in terms of the effect of inflation on the percent 
long-term credit. Inflation significantly reduces the percent long-term credit until 
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inflation reaches about 14 percent. After that point, the effect of inflation on the percent 
long-term credit declines markedly. When the inflation rate reaches about 25 percent, the 
negative effect of inflation on credit maturity increases again. 
-120
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
Es
tim
at
ed
 C
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 o
f I
nf
la
tio
n 
  
 
Figure 2: Impact of Inflation on Credit Maturity at Different Inflation Levels. Plotted are 
the estimated coefficients of inflation and 95 percent confidence intervals when we use 
subsamples ordered by inflation. Each subsample contains 244 observations. The values 
on the abscissa correspond to the subsamples used in the estimations, while values on the 
ordinate represent the coefficient (and confidence intervals) estimates of inflation for the 
corresponding subsample. 
The low range of inflation until about 14 percentage points is very close to the 
ranges reported by Rousseau and Wachtel (2002) and Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001). 
However, our estimations suggest that the negative effect of high inflation reappears at 
“high” inflation rates. It is possible that the indexations of financial contracts cannot 
sufficiently reduce the uncertainty about the real value of nominal payments when 
13.52% 24.62% 
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inflation becomes too high (and too volatile). In addition, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) note that very high inflation rates reveal a deterioration of institutions 
other than central banking. For example, even efficient legal systems take time to enforce 
contracts. As Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic argue, while payments can be indexed, 
borrowers and lenders cannot “index judgment.” 
To recount, the major determinants of the maturity composition of bank credit to 
the private sector are rule of law, inflation, the existence of institutions for credit 
information sharing, and the size of the financial system. These effects are robust across 
various estimation techniques and specifications of the models. They are also robust to 
substituting the rule of law measures with alternative indexes (e.g., the ICRG variables 
and an index of corruption), to different definitions of the credit information sharing 
variable (public vs. private agencies) and to the inclusion of additional control variables 
such as the share of foreign banks and the share of government owned banks (which 
reduce the sample size substantially and are not statistically significant). The next section 
builds on these results to examine the effect of credit maturity (and its determinants) on 
economic growth. 
Credit Maturity and Economic Growth 
The literature usually investigates the effect of finance on growth by averaging 
data over 5 years to reduce the impact of business cycles and to concentrate on long-term 
growth. Proceeding in the same fashion would reduce the number of observations in our 
data set substantially as the sample period for most countries is about 10 years long. 
Fortunately, the literature has dealt with this issue. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) 
39 
 
investigate the impact of equity market liberalization on economic growth by using 
overlapping data. The five-year averages are constructed as 1990-95, then 1991-96, 1992-
97, and so on, producing 6 five-year averages from any 10 years of annual data. While 
this ingenious methodology increases the number of observations, it calls for the 
adjustment of the moving average component in the residuals as introduced by Newey 
and West (1987). Without the adjustment, the standard t-tests lead to a slight over-
rejection (Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 2001). The procedure provides serial-
correlation and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors.8 Following the literature, 
e.g., Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), we estimate 
the growth equations using dynamic panel generalized-method-of-moments (GMM) 
techniques to address the potential endogeneity of credit and other explanatory variables. 
The technique is described in appendix A. 
Results 
Column (1) in Table 6 reports the results of an equation where economic growth 
is explained by private sector credit, initial GDP per capita, government size, openness to 
trade, and inflation. This is a standard specification from the finance and growth literature 
(Beck, Levine, and Loayza 2000). Financial development is expected to lead to faster 
economic growth. High inflation is an indicator of macroeconomic instability and is 
expected to slow down economic growth. More open economies are expected to growth 
faster. A large government size is taken as an indicator of inefficient use of resources and 
                                                 
8Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2003) also use overlapping averages to provide long-term predictions 
of the finance and growth relationship and adjust their standard errors according to Newey and West 
(1987). Petersen (2007) finds that about 7 percent of authors who use panel data in overall finance literature 
adjust their standard errors using the Newey-West procedure. 
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is expected to reduce economic growth. Initial income is included to test for income 
convergence.9 
 
Table 6. Bank Credit Maturity and Economic Growth 
(GMM System Estimation, 5-year Averages) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
2.296 2.015 0.342 2.469Credit 
(0.031) (0.095) (0.682) (0.016)
 6.020 6.824 6.267Percent Long-Term Credit 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.100)
  6.979  Stock Market Value Traded 
  (0.001)  
-2.164 -2.555 -3.638 -4.747Initial income per capita 
(0.031) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000)
0.709 1.698 -3.508 0.178Government size 
(0.800) (0.545) (0.122) (0.940)
17.751 15.090 8.541 12.699Openness to trade 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-2.607 -0.645 -7.650 -8.647Inflation 
(0.173) (0.761) (0.000) (0.000)
44.624 -34.207 -3.282 -68.554Constant 
(0.424) (0.016) (0.677) (0.000)
Sargan test (p-value) 0.204 0.263 0.645 0.962
Serial correlation test (p-value) 0.639 0.207 0.098 0.103
Observations 499 499 387 361
Countries 64 64 44 62
Notes: The dependent variable is the average yearly increase in real per capita GDP. Stock 
Market Value Traded is defined as stock market value traded during a year divided by yearly 
GDP, while other variables are defined in Table 1. Credit, Percent Long-Term Credit, 
Government size, Openness to trade, and Initial income per capita enter the regression as 
log(variable). Inflation enters the regression as log(1 + Inflation). P-values based on Newey-West 
adjusted heteroscedastic-serial consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficients. The Sargan test has the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with 
the residuals. The serial correlation test has a null hypothesis that the errors in the first difference 
regressions do not exhibit second order serial correlation. 
                                                 
9 We could not obtain recent data on education levels for many countries for the later years in our sample. 
We carried out all estimations with a smaller sample including education and obtained qualitatively similar, 
but less statistically significant results on all variables. 
41 
 
The results show that private credit has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on economic growth. Besides being statistically significant, private credit also has 
a large economic effect, similar to the effect reported in the previous literature. To 
illustrate, we compare our results with the estimates of Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000): 
a 10 percent exogenous increase in private credit leads to an additional 0.216 percentage 
points of economic growth per year using our estimated coefficient,10 and to 0.228 
percentage point of additional yearly growth using the estimated coefficient of Beck, 
Levine, and Loayza (2000). The coefficients on all control variables except government 
size have the expected signs. Openness to trade and initial income per capita are 
statistically significant at the accepted confidence levels. The specification tests confirm 
the validity of our results: we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan tests or of 
the serial-correlation test at the accepted confidence levels in all specifications. 
In column (2) we add the percent long-term credit. Credit maturity has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on economic growth as predicted by Bencivenga and 
Smith (1991). In terms of economic size a 10 percent increase in the portion of long-term 
credit leads to an additional 0.574 percentage points of economic growth per year.11 As 
the average growth rate in the sample is 2.98 percent, the impact of an increase in credit 
maturity on growth is large (an increase of over 19 percent).  
Consider the following example to illustrate the economic impact of credit 
maturity. Private credit in Italy is 71.11 percent of GDP which is well above the sample 
average of 53.04 percent. Thus, by the standard measure of financial development, Italy 
                                                 
10 The calculation is as performed follows: 2.296 * ln(1.1) = 0.216. 
11 The calculation is as follows: 6.02 * ln(1.1) = 0.574; where 6.02 is the coefficient of the percent long-
term credit in column (2). 
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has above average financial development. However, only 52.66  percent of private credit 
in Italy is long-term which is below the sample average of 54.14 percent. Thus, Italian 
banks extend relatively large volumes of credit but much of the credit is short-term 
compared to other countries. If private credit in Italy declined to the sample average, 
economic growth in Italy would decline by 0.310 percentage points. However, if the 
percent long-term credit in Italy increased to the sample average, economic growth would 
increase by 0.167 percentage points. Therefore, if most of the reduction in credit 
originated from a decline in short-term credits, the negative impact of reduced credit to 
the private sector would be countered to some extent by the longer maturity of credit.  
For robustness, in column (3) we add the stock market value traded as a measure 
of stock market development. The stock market is an alternative source of long-term 
financing and its inclusion in the model might reduce the effect of credit maturity on 
economic growth. Although the sample size decreases from 64 to 44 countries, the 
coefficient on credit maturity remains statistically significant. Similar results were 
obtained using alternative measures for stock market development such as the turnover 
ratio and stock market capitalization. 
The determinants of credit maturity 
and economic growth 
Section 3 shows that credit maturity is longer in countries that have strong 
institutions, low inflation, and institutions for sharing credit information among financial 
institutions. These characteristics also influence economic growth through their impact 
on credit maturity. Furthermore, the impact is large. Using the estimations in column (2) 
in Table 5, we obtained the predicted values for the percent long-term credit. Then, we 
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reestimated the growth equation using the predicted values for the percent long-term 
credit. These results are reported in column (4) of Table (6).  
Putting together the estimates from sections 3 and 4, we estimate that an increase 
in the rule of law index by 1 index point would increase economic growth (via credit 
maturity) by 0.586 percentage points a year.12 A decrease of inflation by one standard 
deviation leads to a 0.246 percentage points faster economic growth.13 The establishment 
of a credit information sharing institution in a country would raise economic growth by 
0.718 percentage points.14 These effects on economic growth via credit maturity are 
separate from other channels through which strong institutions, low inflation and 
institutions for credit information sharing might affect growth.  
Conclusion 
This chapter is an investigation into one of the important functions of the banking 
system: to transform short-term liquid deposits into long-term illiquid financial assets that 
can fund long gestation activities and, thus, raise the rate of economic growth. The results 
show that the extent to which banks perform this function well has an important effect on 
                                                 
12 1.00 increase in rule of law leads to (5.308 * 1.00 =) 5.31 percentage points increase in percent long-term 
credit. At the average of 54.14 percent long-term credit, this leads to an increase in yearly GDP growth of 
(6.27 * (ln(0.541+ 0.053) – ln(0.541))=) 0.586 percentage points. 
13 0.55 decrease in inflation leads to (3.939 * 0.55 =) 2.17 percentage points increase in percent long-term 
credit. At the sample average of 54.14 percent long-term credit, this leads to an increase in yearly GDP 
growth of (6.27 * (ln(0.5414 + 0.0217) – ln(0.5414))=) 0.246 percentage points. Please note that this 
calculation ignores the independent impact of inflation on growth.  
14The establishment of a credit information sharing institution would increase the percent long-term credit 
by 6.573 percentage points. At the average of 54.14 percent long-term credit, this leads to an increase in 
yearly GDP growth of (6.27*(ln(0.7604+0.06573) – ln(0.7604)=) 0.718 percentage points. 
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the relationship between the financial system and economic growth. Economic growth is 
faster in countries where the banking system extends more long-term credits.  
Furthermore, the results show that credit maturity depends on a number of 
institutional and economic factors. Greater rule of law, low inflation, and schemes for 
sharing of credit information between financial institutions contribute to lengthening the 
maturity of bank credit. From a policy perspective, the institutions for sharing credit 
information probably present the most interest because their establishment is a policy 
choice. We show that such institutions can increase the effectiveness of credit in terms of 
economic growth by making it easier for financial intermediaries to extend long-term 
credits.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT MATURITY 
IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 
The second chapter described how the maturity transformation function of the 
banking sector leads to an increase in output growth from a theoretical perspective. The 
previous chapter presented empirical evidence on the maturity of credit and growth 
relationship and has confirmed the theoretical prediction that longer credit maturity 
increases the rate of economic growth. In addition, the chapter draws on the previous 
literature to formulate hypotheses about the determinants of credit maturity and confirms 
several of them in a broad sample of countries. The main limitation of the previous 
chapter is the definition of long-term credit as credit with contractual maturity longer 
than one year. This chapter overcomes this limitation by looking at the determinants of 
credit maturity by isolating the portion of credit with contractual maturity of one year or 
less, the portion of credit with contractual maturity longer than one year, and the portion 
of credit with contractual maturity longer than five years. Thus, we can investigate short-
term, long-term, and very long-term credit. Credit data that allow such categorization are 
available for 14 transition countries. This is a smaller but more homogeneous sample of 
countries. We also have more frequent quarterly observations compared to the yearly data 
used in the previous chapter. 
46 
 
We find that most results on the determinants of the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than one year obtained in the previous chapter still hold. For example, the 
rule of law remains a significant determinant of credit maturity and the magnitude of the 
estimated coefficients is similar. Similarly, financial deepening is accompanied by 
lengthening of the maturity of credit in both samples. Inflation is a much more significant 
determinant in a broader set of countries, while per capita GDP growth and stock market 
activity are more significant in the set of countries examined here. In addition, we find 
that the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years is driven by similar 
determinants as the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year, but the 
significance and magnitude of each determinant differs. For example, weak rule of law 
reduces the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years more than it does the 
portion of credit with maturity longer than one year. Interestingly, inflation has a larger 
effect on the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year. 
In addition to the determinants discussed in the previous chapter, we also 
investigate whether state and foreign ownership of banks influences credit maturity, and 
find that, credit maturity is longer in countries with more privately owned domestic 
banks. We also look in more detail at credit information sharing institutions and find that 
the quality of information and the ownership structure of such institutions (public vs. 
private) have an important impact on maturity. 
We describe the data in the following section. The literature on financial 
development during transition suggests several additional testable hypotheses on the 
determinants of credit maturity in this particular sample and we review them, along with 
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the determinants studied in the previous chapter, in section 2. Section 3 presents the 
results and section 4 concludes. 
Data 
We use quarterly data on lending by banks to the private sector in 14 countries 
spanning the period from about 1995 to 2006, depending on data availability for the 
individual countries. Table 7 provides variable definitions and details the sources of the 
data for all variables. The sample includes all countries for which we could identify a 
consistent data source. Credit is decomposed into three categories: short-term credit that 
has contractual maturity of one year or less, medium-term credit that has contractual 
maturity between one year and five years, and long-term credit that has contractual 
maturity longer than five years. 
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Table 7. Variable Definitions and Sources 
Variable Definition Sources 
Credit / GDP Credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to the private sector 
divided by quarterly GDP. 
Portion of Credit with 
Maturity Longer than 
One Year 
Credit with the original contractual 
maturity longer than one year divided by 
total credit. 
Portion of Credit with 
Maturity Longer than 
Five Years 
Credit with the original contractual 
maturity longer than five years divided 
by total credit. 
Short-Term Credit Credit with the original contractual 
maturity of one year or less divided by 
quarterly GDP. 
Medium- and Long-
Term Credit 
Credit with an original contractual 
maturity longer than one year divided by 
quarterly GDP. 
Central bank of the 
corresponding country. 
Consulted were the official 
publications and websites. 
Real Per Capita GDP 
Growth 
The percent increase in real per capita 
GDP during the previous year. 
Per Capita GDP  The real per capita GDP in US dollars at 
the beginning of a year. 
Inflation The increase in the CPI from previous 
quarter. 
The official statistical 
institute or the central bank 
of the corresponding 
country. Data were cross 
checked with IMF’s IFS, 
Eurostat, and OECD’s 
quarterly national accounts. 
Rule of Law Index that measures “the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement.” 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2007). 
Banking Industry 
Concentration 
The assets of three largest banks as a 
share of assets of all commercial banks. 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine (2000). 
Credit Information 
Sharing 
Dummy taking 1 if public credit registry 
or private credit bureau operates in a 
country during a year, 0 otherwise. 
Author constructed from  
Brown, Japelli, and Pagano 
(2007). 
State Banks’ Asset 
Share 
Share of majority state-owned banks’ 
assets in total bank sector assets. 
Foreign Banks’ Asset 
Share 
Share of total bank sector assets in banks 
with foreign ownership exceeding 50 
percent. 
EBRD “Structural change 
indicators.” 
Stock Market Turnover Stock Market volume traded during a 
quarter divided by quarterly GDP. 
Official stock exchange of 
corresponding country. 
Output Volatility Root mean squared errors from yt = α + 
εt, using data from the preceding 10 
quarters, where y is Real GDP growth. 
Author constructed from data 
on Real GDP growth. 
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Table 8 lists the time period for the 14 countries in the sample. There are, on 
average, 35 observations per country. Latvia has the longest time series of 58 quarters, 
from the fourth quarter of 1992 to the first quarter of 2007. The earliest observation is in 
Slovenia (first quarter of 1992), while the most recent observations are in the Slovak 
Republic and Ukraine (second quarter of 2007). The shortest time series of only 11 
quarters is from Albania. Although detailed credit data are available for most countries, 
the unavailability of some controls limited the sample. For example, although quarterly 
credit data for Bosnia and Herzegovina are available from 1997 to 2007, we were unable 
to obtain GDP data for the same period. 
Table 8. Bank Credit and Bank Credit Maturity by Country 
Country Average Values  Coverage 
Percent of Credit with Maturity 
Country 
Credit as  a 
Share of 
GDP over 1 year over 5 years 
 From To 
 Albania 9.32 52.03 17.42  Q3/2003 Q1/2006 
 Bulgaria 124.48 62.95 20.96  Q4/1999 Q1/2007 
 Czech Republic 195.96 64.46 39.64  Q1/1993 Q1/2007 
 Estonia 151.02 80.93 42.79  Q1/1994 Q1/2007 
 Hungary 85.73 52.60 34.40  Q4/1995 Q1/2007 
 Latvia 105.13 62.80 22.30  Q4/1992 Q1/2007 
 Lithuania 71.53 60.66 53.55  Q1/1995 Q4/2004 
 Macedonia, FYR 65.81 52.87 -  Q4/2000 Q4/2006 
 Poland 101.12 63.28 34.80  Q4/1996 Q1/2007 
 Romania 57.61 44.41 15.41  Q4/1997 Q1/2007 
 Serbia, Republic of 100.80 56.09 -  Q1/1999 Q1/2007 
 Slovak Republic 210.14 41.49 25.52  Q4/2002 Q2/2007 
 Slovenia 120.37 59.83 -  Q1/1992 Q1/2006 
 Ukraine 89.23 39.73 -  Q4/1996 Q2/2007 
 Sample 112.32 59.02 31.59    
Notes: For variable definitions, please see Table 7. 
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Table 8 shows large differences in terms of financial development measured as 
private credit as a share of quarterly GDP. In Albania, private credit is below 10 percent 
whereas in the Slovak Republic it is over 200 percent of quarterly GDP. 15 Credit as a 
share of quarterly GDP increased over time in most countries. Figure 3 presents this trend 
for several countries over the past 11 years. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estonia Hungary Latvia Poland Slovenia Ukraine
 
Figure 3. Credit as a Share of GDP. Presented are yearly average values of credit divided 
by quarterly GDP for selected countries and time periods. 
The banking system during the early transition period was characterized by state 
ownership of banks, which were forced to extend loans to inefficient state owned 
enterprises under contract terms determined by politics and not by the soundness of 
projects (Drakos 2003; Eller and Haiss 2003; Fink et al. 1998). To increase the efficiency 
                                                 
15 Please note that we divide the stock of credit by quarterly, not by yearly GDP.  Therefore, the numbers 
are about four times greater than when we divide the stock of credit by yearly GDP as in the previous 
chapter. 
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of capital allocations, almost all countries privatized banks and increased the share of 
foreign owned banks (Berglof and Bolton 2002; Eller, Haiss, and Steiner 2005; Naaborg 
et al. 2003). Figure 4 makes apparent the trend of growing asset share of private and 
foreign owned banks over time.  
0%
10%
20%
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60%
70%
80%
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Asset Share of State Owned Banks Asset Share of Foreign Owned Banks
 
Figure 4. State and Foreign Ownership of Banks. Presented are assets owned by each 
type of banks as a share of all bank assets. These are averages across countries. 
Table 9 shows descriptive statistics and the correlations of the variables used in 
the estimations. On average, 59.02 percent of bank credit to the private sector has 
maturity longer than one year, while 31.59 percent has maturity longer than five years.16 
There are, however, large differences between countries as shown in Table 8. Less than 
                                                 
16 This compares well with the data used in previous chapter, as the average portion of credit with maturity 
longer than one year was 54.14 percent. 
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30 percent of credit in Ukraine has maturity longer than one year, while in Estonia such 
credit is over 80 percent. Credit with maturity longer than five years is only 15.41 percent 
of all credit in Romania, while it is 53.55 percent in Lithuania. Figure 5 makes these 
differences clear by presenting credit levels and the percent of credit with maturity longer 
than one year across the sample countries. 
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Figure 5. Bank Credit and Bank Credit Maturity by Country. Values on the left ordinate 
correspond to bars showing credit relative to GDP, while values on the right ordinate 
correspond to a line showing percent of medium- and long-term credit 
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Determinants of bank credit maturity 
Following the discussion in the previous chapter, we employ the rule of law, 
inflation, per capita GDP growth, the level of credit, per capita GDP, credit information 
sharing, banking industry concentration, stock market development, and output volatility 
as potential determinants of credit maturity. The rule of law is included as a measure of 
the quality of contract enforcement and overall institutional quality, while inflation is a 
measure of disincentives for long-term contracting. Per capita GDP and its growth are 
included, respectively, as a proxy for fixed assets and as a measure of investment 
opportunities. The level of private credit is included as a measure of economies of scale 
in collecting information and as a measure of the potential exhaustion of long-term 
lending opportunities. Credit information sharing is included as a proxy for better 
information, while banking industry concentration is included to control for fewer 
informational asymmetries (resulting from closer firm-bank relationship) or credit market 
inefficiencies (resulting from the monopolization of the banking sector). Stock market 
development is included as a measure of an additional information revelation mechanism 
and as an alternative source of long-term financing. Finally, output volatility is included 
as a measure that proxies for business risk. 
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Recall that the empirical hypotheses regarding the effect of these variables on the 
percent long-term credit are as follows: 
+ +
rule of law ,  inflation ,credit info. sharing,
+ / Percentage of
   growth , banking industry concentration ,
Long-Term Credit
+ / + / 
 credit,  stock market,  output volatility
f
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ −⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− − −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. 
While most variables have the same definition as in the previous chapter, we note 
that we use different measures of per capita GDP growth and stock market development. 
Per capita GDP growth in the previous chapter was measured contemporaneously with 
the maturity variables, while now we use per capita GDP growth during the previous year 
as data are unavailable at the quarterly level. In the previous chapter, we measured stock 
market development using the stock market turnover ratio (defined as the volume traded 
divided by capitalization), while in this chapter stock market development is measured 
using stock market turnover (defined as volume traded divided by GDP). 
Additional determinants of credit maturity 
We incorporate several additional explanatory variables, some of which have a 
particular relevance for the transition economies. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999) note that, besides ensuring the stability of the national currency and strong 
institutions,  the government can also promote long-term financial contracting by 
“granting implicit loan guarantees when it adopts a policy of subsidizing loss-generating 
firms” (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999). The authors find that government 
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subsidies to the corporate sector lengthen credit maturity, as these affect the financial 
structure by permitting “some [, mostly small,] firms to obtain long-term loans on 
favorable terms” (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 1999). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (2002) note that the government ownership of banks has the advantage over 
subsidization policies as the government has more power in choosing projects, while 
letting the more efficient private sector implement them. According to this “development 
view,” the ownership of banks enables the government to direct funds “toward strategic 
long-term projects” (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2002). However, the 
authors note that the government, through the ownership of banks, can also direct lending 
to achieve political goals. Therefore, only if the development view holds, we expect 
longer-term credit in countries where the state controls a large fraction of the banking 
system. To capture the extent to which the government controls the banking system we 
use the banking system assets owned by state banks as a share of all banking sector 
assets. 
We also include the asset share of foreign owned banks. Berglof and Bolton 
(2002) and Eller, Haiss, and Steiner (2005) argue that foreign owned banks introduce 
efficiency into the financial sector of the transition countries. In a relatively weak 
banking system, foreign banks enhance transparency and corporate governance, as they 
show a stronger commitment in these areas compared to domestic private banks and state 
owned banks (Naaborg et al. 2003). Foreign-owned banks also possess greater risk 
management expertise and can diversify risk across several countries where they operate 
(de Haas and van Lelyveld 2006). All of those may contribute to the availability of long-
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term credit. However, foreign owned banks may also limit the long-term financing to 
unprofitable project that were previously funded in a less transparent environment. 
The literature (e.g. Fink, Haiss, and Mantler 2005; Fink, Haiss, and Vukšić 2004) 
also points out that the stage of transition is important with more advanced economies 
having more developed financial sectors. We include a dummy variable for EU 
membership as an indicator of transition progress. 
Methodology 
By construction private credit and the percent of credit with maturity longer than 
one year (or longer than five years) are determined jointly and, therefore, we need to 
control for the endogeneity of private credit. One empirical strategy applied in the 
previous chapter was using countries’ legal origin as external instruments for the level of 
credit in random-effects instrumental variable estimation. However, as all countries 
considered in this chapter have socialist legal origin, this approach cannot be applied. 
Therefore, we proceed by first applying fixed-effects estimator to eliminate country 
specific effect. Then we estimate the model using a generalized least squares (GLS) 
random-effects estimator that controls for a heteroscedastic error structure. However, the 
Hausman test reveals that the explanatory variables used in the GLS model are correlated 
with the country specific effects and, therefore, we implement the Hausman-Taylor 
(1981) estimator. This estimator corrects for the correlation between the explanatory 
variables and the country-level random-effects, and is suitable as it does not require the 
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use of external instruments. In addition, the coefficient estimates from the Hausman-
Taylor estimations are similar to ones obtained using fixed-effects.17 
Results 
Table 10 presents the empirical results regarding the determinants of the portion 
of credit with maturity longer than one year and the portion of credit with maturity longer 
than five years using the Hausman-Taylor estimation.18 For each dependent variable we 
use a simple set of determinants and a full set of determinants. 
It is immediately clear that the rule of law has a statistically significant and robust 
effect on either maturity measure, with greater rule of law being associated with longer-
term credit. Looking at the results in column (2), a decrease in the rule of raw by one 
standard deviation (0.58) that would bring the rule of law in Poland to the one in Bulgaria 
leads to a decrease of the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year by 5.16 
percentage points (0.58*8.905). Looking at column (4), the same decrease in the rule of 
law decreases the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years by 6.23 
percentage points (0.58*10.744). The results reveal that weak rule of law reduces the 
                                                 
17 As in the previous chapter, one additional concern is that each dependent variable is a ratio (between 0 
and 100 percent). When we explain the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year, the predicted 
values rarely fall out of the unit interval using any estimator. However, when we explain the portion of 
credit with maturity longer than five years using the fixed-effects estimator, as much as 17 percent of the 
predicted values are outside the unit interval. We follow the previous literature (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 1999; Rodrik and Velasco 1999; Valev 2006; 2007) and proceed without transforming the 
dependent variable. 
18 Tables C2 and C3 in the appendix present the results from fixed-effects and GLS estimations. In 
addition, Tables C4 and C5 present same results when the dependent variables are, respectively, the portion 
of short-term credit (maturity of one year or less) and the portion of medium-term credit (with maturity 
from one year up to [and including] five years). 
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portion of credit with maturity longer than five years more than it does the portion of 
credit with maturity longer than one year. 
Table 10. Determinants of Credit Maturity 
 
Percentage of Credit with 
Maturity Longer than 1 year
Percentage of Credit with 
Maturity Longer than 5 years
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
9.577 8.905 11.840 10.744Rule of Law 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.001) (0.004)
-1.660 -21.541 -6.867 -14.898Inflation  
(0.642) (0.000) (0.030) (0.048)
0.401 1.236 -0.084 -0.052Previous Year GDP Growth 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.531) (0.692)
3.430 3.764 2.419 3.208Credit 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.020) (0.021)
6.028 2.122 13.682 15.609Per Capita GDP 
(0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.000)
 2.642  -2.597Credit Information Sharing 
 (0.024)   (0.019)
 -3.587  2.386Banking Industry Concentration 
 (0.309)   (0.439)
 -6.257  -8.758Stock Market Turnover 
 (0.042)   (0.009)
 0.170  -0.059Output Volatility 
 (0.537)   (0.861)
 -0.264  -0.113State Banks’ Asset Share 
 (0.000)   (0.007)
 -0.034  -0.025Foreign Banks’ Asset Share 
 (0.129)   (0.242)
-18.219 -11.792 -35.417 -30.835EU Member 
(0.138) (0.404) (0.060) (0.000)
44.253 57.806 8.485 Constant 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.636) 
Hausman Test:  χ2 (d.f.) 0.22 (5) 1.05 (11) 1.33 (5) 0.37 (11)
p-value 0.989 0.999 0.931 1.000
Observations 461 317 278 211
Countries 14 11 10 9
Notes: See Table 7 for variable definitions. Results are based on Hausman-Taylor estimation, 
where Credit is endogenous. P-values are reported in parentheses below coefficients. Hausman 
test has a null hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-specific 
random-effects. 
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Higher inflation leads to relatively less credit with maturity longer than one year, 
but the results are less robust as the estimated coefficient on inflation is insignificant in 
the simple set of determinants. Higher inflation also leads to less credit with maturity 
longer than five years. Looking at the statistically significant coefficient in column (2), an 
increase in inflation by one standard deviation (0.298) decreases the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than one year by 6.42 percentage points (-21.541*0.298). Looking at the 
comparable coefficient in column (4), the same increase in inflation decreases the portion 
of credit with maturity longer than five years by 4.44 percentage points (-14.898*0.298). 
When statistically significant, inflation has a greater effect on the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than one year. 
Per capita GDP growth significantly increases the portion of credit with maturity 
longer than one year, while it is not a significant determinant of the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than five years. This is an intuitive result: while an increase in GDP 
growth (an indicator of investment opportunity) increases medium-term lending, long-
term lending is not influenced by overall expectations, and the financing of projects with 
longer gestation is unaffected by the current economic performance. 
The level of credit as percent of GDP has a positive and statistically significant 
effect on both maturity measures. Countries with deeper financial markets have a greater 
fraction of credit with maturity longer than one year and longer than five years. To 
illustrate, if FYR Macedonia (where private credit is 65.81 percent of quarterly GDP) had 
the level of private credit of Bulgaria (124.48 percent), it would have 2.21 percentage 
points greater fraction of credit with maturity longer than one year, based on column (2), 
and it would also have 1.88 percentage points greater fraction of credit with maturity 
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longer than five years, based on column (4). Thus, the process of financial deepening is 
accompanied by lengthening of the maturity of credit. This result is in line with Diamond 
(1984) who suggests that larger banking sectors have economies of scale in obtaining 
information and monitoring borrowers. This result contradicts Diamond and Rajan (2000) 
who argue that maturity shortens with the expansion of the banking sector, as a larger 
pool of smaller, riskier, and less collateralized borrowers would obtain access to external 
financing. 
The coefficient estimate of per capita GDP, used as a proxy for the amount of 
fixed assets in a country, is a significant determinant of both maturity measures. 
However, the coefficients have much larger magnitude when we explain the portion of 
credit with maturity longer than five years (13.7 to 15.6) when compared to the 
corresponding coefficients for the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year 
(2.1 to 6.0).19 The results are intuitive, as the amount of fixed assets is particularly 
important for the long-term financing. An increase in per capita GDP of $1,000 (an 
increase that would bring income in Ukraine to the level of Bulgaria) would result in an 
increase in the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years by between 13.68 
and 15.61 percentage points. As in Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999), the results 
suggest that maturity matching is an important determinant of credit maturity in this set 
of countries. 
To test whether information sharing affects credit maturity, we follow Qian and 
Strahan (2007) and include a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country had either a 
public credit registry or a private credit bureau at the beginning of the year. Our results 
                                                 
19 In addition, when explaining portion of credit with maturity y longer than one year, the coefficient 
estimate of per capita GDP is negative in GLS estimation as shown in Table C2. 
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suggest that credit information sharing institutions increase the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than one year, while the effect on the portion of credit with maturity 
longer than five years is the opposite. The results suggest that the effect on each portion 
is about 2½ percentage points. We provide further discussion later on in this section. 
Stock market turnover is negatively associated with both measures of maturity. 
Moreover, this negative effect is greater in magnitude (by about 40 percent) for the 
portion of credit with maturity longer than five years. Therefore, the results suggest that 
stock market activity in the transition countries can be considered as an alternative source 
for long-term financing. The asset share of state owned banks has a negative and 
significant effect on both measures of maturity, but the effect has greater magnitude on 
the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year. The asset share of foreign owned 
banks also has a negative effect, but much lower significance. Nevertheless, the two 
results suggest that privately owned domestic banks tend to lengthen the credit maturity. 
Therefore, in this set of countries we find the evidence that opposes the “development 
view,” where the government owned banks direct funds toward strategic long-term 
projects. The negative coefficient estimate of the EU membership dummy suggest that 
countries at the earlier stage of transition have a greater portion of credit with maturity 
longer than five years, while the effect on the portion of credit with maturity longer than 
one year is insignificant. Output volatility and the banking industry concentration are not 
significant determinants of credit maturity.20 
                                                 
20 We briefly compare the results on the determinants of the portion of credit with maturity longer than one 
year obtained here to the results obtained in the previous chapter using broader set of countries. Rule of law 
and the level of credit remain significant determinants of maturity. Inflation is a more significant 
determinant in a broader set of countries, while per capita GDP and its growth are more significant here. 
Credit information sharing has positive impact, but the estimated coefficient in a broad set of countries has 
a greater magnitude (about 130 percent greater). 
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In summary, the portions of credit with maturity longer than one year and longer 
than five years are driven by similar determinants. Strong rule of law, the higher level of 
financial development, and low government ownership of banks significantly increase 
both portions of credit. Inflation has a greater negative effect on the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than one year, while the stock market turnover has a greater negative 
effect on the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years. Per capita GDP 
growth significantly increases the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year, 
while per capita GDP significantly increases the portion of credit with maturity longer 
than five years. Credit information sharing increases the medium-term credit, as it 
lengthens the overall maturity but decreases the portion of very long-term credit. 
Credit Information Sharing and Credit Maturity 
For each country in this chapter Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2007) collected 
information about the year when a public credit registry or a private credit bureau was 
established. In addition, the authors identify whether these institutions collect information 
on consumers and/or firms, positive and/or negative information, how long the 
information is kept, and what is the minimum amount of loans for which data are 
collected. We use this information to construct a quality index for both types of 
institutions, similar to the one in Brown, Jappelli, and Pagano (2007). If the institution is 
present, the index takes on a value of 1, and 0 otherwise. If the institution existed for at 
least six consecutive quarters, an additional point is added to the index. If information is 
kept on both firms and consumers, an additional point is added to the index. Similarly, an 
additional point is added if both positive and negative information is reported. An 
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additional point is added if information is kept for at least two years. The final point is 
added if the minimum amount of a loan for which the institution collects data is below 
yearly per capita GDP (or if the threshold does not exist). Therefore, the quality index for 
each type of institution ranges from 0 (if the institution does not exist) to 6 (if it meets all 
criteria listed above). The quality index for the public credit registry and the private credit 
bureau are added together to form an overall quality index. 
Table 11 presents the results when we estimate the impact of different measures 
of credit information sharing on both maturity measures. The results are based on a full 
set of determinants, but for brevity we do not report the coefficients of the other 
determinants. Columns (1) and (5) correspond to the estimated coefficients from columns 
(2) and (4) from Table 10. The presence of credit information sharing institutions 
Table 11. Credit Maturity and Credit Information Sharing 
 
 
Percentage of Credit with 
Maturity Longer than 1 year 
Percentage of Credit with 
Maturity Longer than 5 years 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2.642 -2.597  Presence 
(0.024) (0.019)  
0.603 1.586 Public Credit 
Registry (0.664) (0.235) 
3.869 -7.067 Private Credit  
Bureau (0.002) (0.000) 
0.628  -0.828Quality Index 
(Overall) (0.003)  (0.000)
1.178  -1.818Quality Index 
(Public) (0.001)  (0.000)
-0.033  0.601C
re
di
t I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
Sh
ar
in
g 
Quality Index 
(Private) (0.932)  (0.115)
Notes: Estimation based on Hausman-Taylor model with a full set of determinants. P-values are 
reported in parentheses below coefficients. 
65 
 
increases the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year, while it decreases the 
portion of credit with maturity longer than five years. When we look separately at the 
presence of a public credit registry and a private credit bureau in columns (2) and (6), we 
see that both results are driven by the presence of private credit bureaus. The presence of 
a public credit registry does not have any significant influence on either maturity 
measure. 
Similar results are obtained in columns (3) and (7) when we use the index of 
overall quality, as defined above, instead of an indicator for the existence of an 
institution. The greater quality of the information sharing mechanisms increases the 
portion of credit with maturity longer than one year, while it decreases the portion of 
credit with maturity longer than five years. When the overall quality index is decomposed 
into a quality index of public credit registries and a quality index of private credit 
bureaus, we see new interesting result in columns (4) and (8). Namely, the increase in the 
portion of credit with maturity longer than one year and the reduction in the portion of 
credit with maturity longer than five years are both driven by the quality of public credit 
registries. The quality of private credit bureaus does not have a significant influence on 
either measure of maturity. 
In summary, the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year and the 
portion of credit with maturity longer than five years are both influenced by the credit 
information sharing mechanisms. Credit information sharing increases the portion of 
credit with maturity longer than one year, while it decreases the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than five years. One explanation for this finding is the theoretical 
prediction of Diamond (1991) where, in a setting with private information, good firms 
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borrow short- and long-term to extract the benefits of good news while lowering liquidity 
risk. With credit information sharing mechanisms information is no longer private. 
Therefore, firms reduce short-term debt to lower the liquidity risk (as firms do not have to 
reveal information) and they decrease long-term to lower the contractual cost. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that effects arise through the establishment of private 
credit bureaus or increased quality of public credit registries.  
Institutions and Credit Maturity 
To assess the robustness of the impact of rule of law as a measure of institutions, 
we substitute it with alternative indexes of institutional quality. We use indexes of 
government effectiveness (measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures), political 
stability (measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized 
or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means), control of corruption (measuring the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain), regulatory power (measuring 
the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations 
that permit and promote private sector development), and EBRD reform index 
(measuring banking reform and interest rate liberalization). The first four indexes come 
from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007) and they range from -2.5 to 2.5. The last 
index comes from the EBRD transition indicators, and this index ranges from 1 to 5. 
Table 12 presents the results when we substitute the rule of law with different 
institutional measures. The results are based on a full set of determinants, but for brevity 
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Table 12. Credit Maturity and Alternative Institutional Measures 
Dependent Variable 
Rule of 
Law 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Political 
Stability
Control of 
Corruption 
Regulatory 
Power 
EBRD 
Reform 
Index 
8.905 17.026 2.909 16.171 10.101 11.061Percentage of Credit 
with Maturity Longer 
than 1 year 
(0.009) (0.000) (0.160) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
10.744 14.024 9.556 14.648 3.671 7.767Percentage of Credit 
with Maturity Longer 
than 5 years 
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.217) (0.000)
Notes: Estimation based on Hausman-Taylor model with a full set of determinants. P-values are 
reported in parentheses below coefficients. 
we do not report the coefficients of the other determinants. The results suggest that, 
similar to the rule of law, the alternative institutional measures increase both measures of 
maturity. However, the statistical significance and the magnitude of the impact on the 
two maturity measures differ. The impact of political stability on the portion of credit 
with maturity longer than five years is greater than the effect on the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than one year. 
Other indexes have a greater impact on the portion of credit with maturity longer 
than one year. The impact of control of corruption on the portion of credit with maturity 
longer than one year is 10 percent greater than the impact on the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than five years, the impact of government effectiveness is 21 percent 
greater, while the impact of EBRD reform index is 42 percent greater. The impact of 
regulatory power on the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years is not 
statistically significant. Despite some differences, the results suggest that institutions are 
important determinant of credit maturity. Our results suggest that strong institutions 
lengthen the maturity of credit. This impact is similar for the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than one year and for the portion of credit with maturity longer than five 
68 
 
years. Therefore, ours results suggest that strong institutions lengthen the maturity of 
credit primarily through the positive impact on the long-term credit with maturity longer 
than five years.21 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter shows that the extent to which banks perform their maturity 
transformation function has an important effect on the relationship between the financial 
system and economic growth. The availability of long-term credit is particularly 
important, as economic growth is faster in countries where the banking system extends 
more long-term credits. However, the data limitations allowed only the investigation of 
the determinants of credit with maturity longer than one year. 
In this chapter, we overcome this problem by looking at the portion of credit with 
maturity longer than five years. We show that the maturity of bank credit to the private 
sector is longer in countries with strong rule of law, low inflation, larger financial system, 
higher level of economic development, less liquid stock markets, and smaller relative size 
of state owned banks. These effects are robust across two definitions of maturity and 
across various estimation techniques and model specifications. The effect of alternative 
institutional measures is similar to one of rule of law. Credit information sharing tends to 
increase the portion of credit with maturity longer than one year, while it tends to reduce 
the portion of credit with maturity longer than five years. This effect is strong if private 
credit bureaus exist or if public credit registries have greater quality of information.  
                                                 
21 The Hausman-Taylor estimation in Table C5 shows the negative impact on the medium-term credit when 
the rule of law is used as an institutional measure. These findings suggest that the positive impact on 
medium- and long-term credit arises primarily through the effect on long-term credit. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation is an investigation into one of the important functions of the 
banking system: to transform short-term liquid deposits into long-term illiquid financial 
assets that can fund long gestation activities and, thus, raise the rate of economic growth. 
Using a new data set on the maturity of bank credit to the private sector in 74 countries, 
the dissertation shows that the extent to which banks perform their maturity 
transformation function has an important effect on the relationship between the financial 
system and economic growth. The dissertation shows that the availability of long-term 
credit is particularly important, as economic growth is faster in countries where the 
banking system extends more long-term credits. Bank credit maturity has a significant 
effect on economic growth even after controlling for stock market as an alternative 
source of long-term financing. 
Furthermore, the dissertation shows that credit maturity depends on a number of 
institutional and economic factors. Greater rule of law, low inflation, deeper financial 
sector, and schemes for sharing of credit information between financial institutions 
contribute to lengthening the maturity of bank credit. From a policy perspective, the 
institutions for sharing credit information probably present the most interest because their 
establishment is a policy choice. We show that such institutions can increase the 
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effectiveness of credit in terms of economic growth by making it easier for financial 
intermediaries to extend long-term credits. 
The dissertation uses an additional data set on the maturity of bank credit to the 
private sector in 14 transition countries. This data set provides several definitions of 
maturity and allows for the investigation of the determinants of short-term credit, long-
term credit, and very long-term credit. There are several additional interesting results 
obtained using this data set. The results of rule of law, inflation, financial deepening, and 
credit information sharing being significant determinants of credit maturity obtained in a 
broad set of countries still hold. Furthermore, the additional results suggest that credit 
maturity is longer in countries at the higher level of economic development, with less 
liquid stock markets, and with more privately owned domestic banks. The results suggest 
that credit information sharing mechanisms lengthen the maturity of credit if credit 
information sharing institutions are privately owned or have greater quality of 
information. Furthermore, the alternative institutional measures have robust effect on 
maturity, similar to the one of rule of law. 
The results presented in this dissertation are, to my knowledge, the first empirical 
test of an important theoretical idea–that banks contribute to economic growth by 
providing liquidity services. The dissertation provides an important missing link between 
the theoretical and empirical literature on financial development and economic growth by 
investigating a particular channel through which financial development affects economic 
growth–an effort that is usually severely hampered by data availability.  
Hopefully, future work can illuminate empirically the determinants of other 
channels though which finance affects growth, e.g., by distinguishing between good and 
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bad risk, by monitoring borrowers, by aggregating savings into large-size investments, 
and by cross sectional risk diversification. Ideally, we would be able to compare the 
channels through which finance affects growth in various institutional and economic 
environments. We would also be able to investigate whether lax rule of law diminishes 
the positive effect of credit on the economy because banks 1) cannot assess risk; 2) 
monitor and influence the behavior of borrower; and/or as we show here 3) curtail long-
term financing. We would be able to investigate how the relative importance of different 
channels evolves as the financial system develops. In summary, investigating the 
channels through which finance affects growth presents a number of exciting research 
opportunities. 
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APPENDIX A 
GMM METHODOLOGY 
 
Let yit be the logarithm of real per capita GDP in country i at time t. We are 
interested in the following equation:  
 , , 1 , 1 , ,( 1) ,i t i t i t i t i i ty y y Xα β η ε− − ′− = − + + +  (1) 
where yi,t - yi,t-1 is the growth rate in real per capita GDP, Xi,t is a set of explanatory 
variables, including our measures for financial development, iη  captures unobserved 
country-specific effects, and itε  is an error term. We rewrite equation (1) as: 
 , , 1 , , ,i t i t i t i i ty y Xα β η ε− ′= + + +  (2) 
and take first differences to eliminate the country-specific effect, as it is correlated with 
lagged dependent variable: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , 1 , 1 , 2 , , 1 , , 1 .i t i t i t i t i t i t i t i ty y y y X Xα β ε ε− − − − −′− = − + − + −  (3) 
By construction, in equation (3), the lagged difference in per capita GDP is 
correlated with the error term, which along with the potential endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables X, requires the use of instruments. The GMM difference estimator 
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uses the lagged levels of the explanatory variables as instruments under the conditions 
that the error term is not serially correlated and that the lagged levels of the explanatory 
variables are weakly exogenous (i.e.,, they are uncorrelated with future error terms). Then 
the following moment conditions are used to calculate the difference estimator: 
 ( ), , , 1 0 for 2; 3,...., ,i t s i t i tE y s t Tε ε− −⎡ ⎤− = ≥ =⎣ ⎦  (4) 
 ( ), , , 1 0 for 2; 3,...., .i t s i t i tE X s t Tε ε− −⎡ ⎤− = ≥ =⎣ ⎦  (5) 
Since persistence in the explanatory variables may adversely affect the small-
sample and asymptotic properties of the difference estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998), 
the difference estimator is further combined with an estimator in levels to produce a 
system estimator. The inclusion of a levels equation also allows us to use information on 
cross-country differences, which is not possible with the difference estimator alone.  
The equation in levels uses the lagged differences of the explanatory variables as 
instruments under two conditions. First, the error term is not serially correlated. Second, 
although there may be correlation between the levels of the explanatory variables and the 
case-specific error term, there is no correlation between the difference in the explanatory 
variables and the error term. This yields the following stationarity properties: 
 , , , ,and and .i t p i i t q i i t p i i t q iE y E y E X E X p qη η η η+ + + +⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = ∀⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (6) 
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The additional moment conditions for the regression in levels are:  
 ( )( ), , 1 , 0 for 1,i t s i t s i i tE y y sη ε− − −⎡ ⎤− + = =⎣ ⎦  (7) 
 ( )( ), , 1 , 0 for 1.i t s i t s i i tE X X sη ε− − −⎡ ⎤− + = =⎣ ⎦   (8) 
In summary, the GMM system estimator is obtained using the moment conditions 
in equations (4), (5), (7), and (8). In addition, as Beck and Levine (2004), we use 
alternative procedure developed by Calderon, Chong, and Loayza (2002) and Loayza, 
Chong, and Calerdon (1999) to control for the over-fitting by reducing the dimensionality 
of instruments. This procedure has one shortcoming: in order to perform it we loose one 
time period from the sample. Nevertheless, given the sample size, we are still able to 
make robust estimates. 
As our data are constructed using overlapping averages, we need to adjust the 
moving average component in the residuals. We do this by adjusting standard errors 
according to Newey-West  (1987) procedure, modified for the use in panel data. Petersen 
(2007) points that, unlike for the single time series, in the panel data context the 
weighting matrix is not necessary for the estimate of central term in covariance matrix to 
be positive semi-definite. Nevertheless, we follow Newey-West approach assuming that 
as the distance between observations goes to infinity, the correlation between residuals 
approaches zero. Therefore, we use weighting matrix which multiplies the covariance of 
lag l by ( ) ( )( )max1 1 1l l− − + , where lmax is the maximum lag order. Weighting matrix 
with such elements will weigh heaviest the adjacent observation, while the weights 
decrease as distance between observations increases. We adjust the dependence for up to 
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five lags (i.e., we set lmax to 5) and estimate correlations only between lagged residuals in 
the same cluster. As suggested by several papers, we have repeated the procedure by 
including up to T-1 lags, where T is the maximum number of years per country, but doing 
so leaves our standard errors almost unchanged. This procedure provides serial-
correlation and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. 
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APPENDIX B 
LIST OF COUNTRIES 
 
Listed countries have been used in the estimations in chapter 3, while countries 
with * have been used in estimations in chapter 4. 
Albania * Gabon  Nicaragua  
Armenia  Georgia  Niger  
Austria  Germany  Norway  
Azerbaijan  Greece  Poland * 
Bahamas, The Guinea Bissau Portugal  
Bangladesh Hungary * Romania *  
Belgium  Iceland  Russia  
Benin  Ireland  Saudi Arabia  
Bolivia  Italy  Senegal  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Ivory Coast  Serbia, Republic of * 
Bulgaria * Jordan  Singapore 
Burkina Kazakhstan  Slovak Republic * 
Cameroon  Kyrgyz Republic  Slovenia * 
Central African Republic  Latvia * Spain  
Chad  Lesotho  Sri Lanka  
China  Lithuania * Sweden  
Congo  Luxembourg  Taiwan 
Cyprus  Macau  Togo  
Czech Republic * Macedonia, FYR * Tunisia  
Denmark Malaysia  Turkey 
Equatorial Guinea Mali  Ukraine * 
Estonia * Mongolia  United States  
Finland Mozambique  Uruguay  
France  Netherlands, The Yemen  
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APPENDIX C 
ADDITIONAL ESTIMATIONS 
 
This appendix contains additional estimations from chapter 3 and chapter 4. Table 
C1 presents results from the additional estimation techniques regarding the determinants 
of credit maturity from chapter 3, as discussed in footnote 5. Tables C2 and C3 present 
results from the additional estimation techniques regarding the determinants of credit 
maturity, as discussed in footnote 18. Tables C4 and C5 present same set of results as in 
Tables C2 and C3, but the dependent variables are, respectively, the portion of credit with 
maturity of one year or less and the portion of credit with maturity from one year up to 
(and including) five years. 
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Table C1. Determinants of Credit Maturity – Additional Estimations 
 Fixed Effects GLS GLS – AR(1)  2SLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
5.607 4.431 6.407 16.879 5.061 5.173 3.008 5.291Rule of Law 
(0.196) (0.515) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.317) (0.152)
-3.985 -9.321 -3.034 -27.937 -1.600 -6.242 -3.892 -10.247Inflation  
(0.014) (0.360) (0.092) (0.000) (0.025) (0.323) (0.000) (0.126)
0.268 0.249 0.433 0.527 0.027 0.251 0.257 0.362Growth 
(0.351) (0.248) (0.003) (0.001) (0.762) (0.038) (0.119) (0.109)
10.615 14.280 11.748 9.896 10.758 14.238 15.575 14.463Credit 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.684 0.457 -0.073 -0.352 0.200 0.050 -0.158 -0.210Income 
(0.066) (0.268) (0.429) (0.001) (0.104) (0.729) (0.533) (0.437)
6.129 4.072 4.060 5.155Credit Information 
Sharing (0.002) (0.001) (0.012) (0.017)
4.622 4.147 2.907 4.727Banking Industry 
Concentration (0.427) (0.009) (0.080) (0.181)
0.044 0.492 1.152 -0.085Stock Market 
Turnover Ratio (0.951) (0.299) (0.022) (0.905)
-0.864 5.362 0.777 0.382Output Volatility 
(0.545) (0.000) (0.441) (0.837)
-0.788 -0.544 -0.581 -0.647Manufacturing Share 
of Output (0.082) (0.000) (0.000) (0.022)
-8.452 -15.347 -10.670 -11.068 U.K. Legal Origin 
(0.038) (0.001) (0.022) (0.032) 
-5.440 -10.414 -6.992 -8.857 French Legal Origin 
(0.162) (0.016) (0.111) (0.051) 
-0.223 -2.672 -1.164 2.929 German Legal Origin 
(0.955) (0.557) (0.788) (0.514) 
9.951 13.151 10.342 15.960 Socialist Legal Origin 
(0.015) (0.006) (0.027) (0.002) 
58.801 77.625 65.613 65.258 64.472 74.863 71.521 78.519Constant 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hausman Test: χ2 
(d.f.) 
7.48
(5)
183.81
(10)
8.69
(5)
33.67 
(10) 
19.22
(5)
9.43
(10)
p-value 0.187 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.001 0.492
Observations 504 284 504 284 504 281 504 284
Countries 71 45 71 45 71 42 71 45
Notes:  See Table 1 for variable definitions. P-values are reported in parentheses below 
coefficients. In 2SLS, legal origin dummies are used as instruments for endogenous credit. 
Hausman test has a null hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-
specific random-effects. Credit, Banking Industry Concentration, Stock Market Turnover Ratio, 
and Output Volatility enter the regression as log(variable), while Income is in thousands. 
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Table C2. Percentage of Credit with Maturity Longer than One 
Year (Additional Estimations) 
 Fixed Effects GLS  Hausman-Taylor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
9.919 8.663 3.474 13.757 9.577 8.905Rule of Law 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.092) (0.000) (0.012) (0.009)
-1.164 -20.679 -31.446 -53.893 -1.660 -21.541Inflation  
(0.843) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.642) (0.000)
0.392 1.213 0.925 1.535 0.401 1.236Previous Year GDP Growth 
(0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
2.867 3.312 9.834 9.605 3.430 3.764Credit 
(0.060) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.005)
6.590 2.690 -1.006 -1.412 6.028 2.122Per Capita GDP 
(0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.036)
2.536  -0.128   2.642Credit Information Sharing 
(0.010)  (0.907)   (0.024)
-4.134  4.680   -3.587Banking Industry 
Concentration (0.259)  (0.153)   (0.309)
-5.823  -21.639   -6.257Stock Market Turnover 
(0.009)  (0.000)   (0.042)
0.119  1.258   0.170Output Volatility 
(0.682)  (0.001)   (0.537)
-0.254  -0.404   -0.264State Banks’ Asset Share 
(0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)
-0.036  -0.087   -0.034Foreign Banks’ Asset Share 
(0.095)  (0.001)   (0.129)
4.817 -5.148 -18.219 -11.792EU Member 
(0.019) (0.180) (0.138) (0.404)
27.930 47.115 47.992 63.263 44.253 57.806Constant 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Hausman Test:  χ2 (d.f.) 84.31 (5) 8.99 (11) 0.22 (5) 1.05 (11)
p-value 0.000 0.6232 0.989 0.999
Observations 461 317 461 317 461 317
Countries 14 11 14 11 14 11
Notes:  See Table 7 for variable definitions. P-values are reported in parentheses below 
coefficients. In the Hausman-Taylor estimation Credit is endogenous. Hausman test has a null 
hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-specific random-effects. 
Per Capita GDP is in thousands. 
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Table C3. Percentage of Credit with Maturity Longer than Five 
Years (Additional Estimations) 
 Fixed Effects GLS  Hausman-Taylor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
12.583 10.508 5.793 16.573  11.840 10.744Rule of Law 
(0.000) (0.009) (0.066) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.004)
-6.788 -15.085 -1.696 -18.562  -6.867 -14.898Inflation  
(0.178) (0.066) (0.722) (0.086)  (0.030) (0.048)
-0.102 -0.080 0.872 0.786  -0.084 -0.052Previous Year GDP Growth 
(0.370) (0.429) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.531) (0.692)
2.136 2.572 7.823 7.423  2.419 3.208Credit 
(0.033) (0.135) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.020) (0.021)
13.930 16.551 5.378 3.496  13.682 15.609Per Capita GDP 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)
-3.030 5.513  -2.597Credit Information Sharing 
(0.004) (0.000)  (0.019)
1.870 6.347  2.386Banking Industry 
Concentration (0.535) (0.073)  (0.439)
-8.744 -1.646  -8.758Stock Market Turnover 
(0.007) (0.767)  (0.009)
-0.032 -0.029  -0.059Output Volatility 
(0.918) (0.950)  (0.861)
-0.109 -0.095  -0.113State Banks’ Asset Share 
(0.014) (0.023)  (0.007)
-0.030 0.002  -0.025Foreign Banks’ Asset Share 
(0.174) (0.951)  (0.242)
-15.453 -5.722  -35.417 -30.835EU Member 
(0.000) (0.123)  (0.060) (0.000)
-26.829 -33.942 10.640   8.485Constant 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010)   (0.636)
Hausman Test:  χ2 (d.f.) 40.90 (5)201.14 (11) 1.33 (5) 0.37 (11)
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.931 1.000
Observations 278 211 278 211 278 211
Countries 10 9 10 9 10 9
Notes:  See Table 7 for variable definitions. P-values are reported in parentheses below 
coefficients. In the Hausman-Taylor estimation Credit is endogenous. Hausman test has a null 
hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-specific random-effects. 
Per Capita GDP is in thousands. 
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Table C4. Percentage of Credit with Maturity of One Year or Less 
 Fixed Effects GLS  Hausman-Taylor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
-9.919 -8.663 -3.474 -13.757 -9.577 -8.905Rule of Law 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.092) (0.000) (0.012) (0.009)
1.164 20.679 31.446 53.893 1.660 21.541Inflation  
(0.843) (0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.642) (0.000)
-0.392 -1.213 -0.925 -1.535 -0.401 -1.236Previous Year GDP Growth 
(0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-2.867 -3.312 -9.834 -9.605 -3.430 -3.764Credit 
(0.060) (0.039) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.005)
-6.590 -2.690 1.006 1.412 -6.028 -2.122Per Capita GDP 
(0.000) (0.045) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.036)
-2.536 0.128 -2.642Credit Information Sharing 
(0.010) (0.907) (0.024)
4.134 -4.680 3.587Banking Industry 
Concentration (0.259) (0.153) (0.309)
5.823 21.639 6.257Stock Market Turnover 
(0.009) (0.000) (0.042)
-0.119 -1.258 -0.170Output Volatility 
(0.682) (0.001) (0.537)
0.254 0.404 0.264State Banks’ Asset Share 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.036 0.087 0.034Foreign Banks’ Asset Share 
(0.095) (0.001) (0.129)
-4.817 5.148 18.219 11.792EU Member 
(0.019) (0.180) (0.138) (0.404)
72.070 52.885 52.008 36.737 55.747 42.194Constant 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Hausman Test:  χ2 (d.f.) 84.31 (5) 8.99 (11) 0.22 (5) 1.05 (11)
p-value 0.000 0.623 0.998 0.999
Observations 461 317 461 317 461 317
Countries 14 11 14 11 14 11
Notes:  See Table 7 for variable definitions. P-values are reported in parentheses below 
coefficients. In the Hausman-Taylor estimation Credit is endogenous. Hausman test has a null 
hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-specific random-effects. 
Per Capita GDP is in thousands. 
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Table C5. Percentage of Credit with Maturity from One Year 
up to (and Including) Five Years 
 Fixed Effects GLS  Hausman-Taylor 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
-14.670 -10.568 7.429 5.235  -14.015 -10.348Rule of Law 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.028)  (0.000) (0.002)
-9.284 -51.884 -25.051 -95.924  -9.322 -52.583Inflation  
(0.214) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)
0.538 0.406 0.636 0.319  0.537 0.384Previous Year GDP Growth 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.026)  (0.000) (0.001)
-4.518 -2.215 -2.567 -2.533  -4.643 -2.836Credit 
(0.000) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.015)
-2.726 -7.475 -6.053 -5.906  -2.669 -6.640Per Capita GDP 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)
3.696 -2.984  3.238Credit Information Sharing 
(0.000) (0.001)  (0.001)
-2.064 -4.137  -2.491Banking Industry 
Concentration (0.376) (0.117)  (0.349)
2.624 5.414  2.733Stock Market Turnover 
(0.322) (0.201)  (0.346)
0.407 2.202  0.457Output Volatility 
(0.218) (0.000)  (0.118)
-0.158 -0.391  -0.158State Banks’ Asset Share 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
-0.117 -0.241  -0.124Foreign Banks’ Asset Share 
(0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)
8.335 84.248  27.972 74.932EU Member 
(0.001) (0.000)  (0.021) (0.000)
51.265 79.467 47.325   22.602Constant 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.052)
Hausman Test:  χ2 (d.f.) 243.33(5)636.96 (11) 1.23 (5) 2.31 (11)
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.942 0.997
Observations 278 211 278 211 278 211
Countries 10 9 10 9 10 9
Notes:  See Table 7 for variable definitions. P-values are reported in parentheses below 
coefficients. In the Hausman-Taylor estimation Credit is endogenous. Hausman test has a null 
hypothesis that explanatory variables are not correlated with the country-specific random-effects. 
Per Capita GDP is in thousands. 
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